(财政部、国家税务总局关于进一步支持企业事业单位改制重组有关契税政策的通知)
Following the State Council’s call to introduce policies promoting corporate restructuring in Guofa [2014] No. 14, MoF and SAT released Caishui [2015] No. 37 (“Circular 37”) to exempt from deed tax the transfer of land use rights and building ownership rights in the following corporate transactions:
Gaining access to development land in the PRC has often been linked to government connections and dubious business practices. However, a number of investigations into the allegedly corrupt activities of high-level real estate executives in China have recently taken place.
Moody's announced in October 2014 that the detainment of Agile Property Holdings' chairman, Chen Zhoulin by government authorities was credit negative, in Moody's view, "similar incidents would adversely affect developers' borrowing costs and/or their access to offshore funding". The events that have unfolded since show that Moody's were right on the money.
Introduction
China Tax Monthly – 2015 Midyear Review Beijing/Hong Kong/Shanghai In this midyear issue of the China Tax Monthly, we present the most interesting and most important regulatory changes and administrative cases from the first six months of 2015. Two major trends are worthy of note. First, the PRC tax authorities are continuing to strengthen transfer pricing enforcement and anti-avoidance practice. Second, though cross-border restructurings still face challenges, China offered various preferential tax policies to domestic corporate restructurings during the first half of the year.
In 2009, to promote corporate restructuring, the MoF and the SAT jointly released Circular Caishui [2009] No. 59 to grant tax deferral treatment to qualified corporate restructuring transactions (recently modified by Circular 109, mentioned above, which expanded its scope).
In 2010, the SAT released Announcement [2010] No. 4, providing procedural guidelines to benefit from the tax deferral treatment.
破产隔离机制是资产证券化运作的枢纽，而真实出售又是破产隔离机制的核心。 作为结构性融资的资产证券化制度，其主要的特质在于发起人与特殊目的载体（以下 简称“SPV”）之间的风险隔离，亦即发起人通过风险隔离方式将基础资产信用风险 和收益转移给 SPV。
我国自 2005 年正式引进资产证券化制度，并分别以信贷资产证券化和企业资产 证券化进行试点。然而，从我国现有的资产证券化案例来看，除了信贷资产支持证券 中的优先级产品属于“真实出售型”以外，其他基于信托计划和资产支持专项计划 （以下简称“专项计划”）的企业资产证券化产品究其实质都属于“担保融资型”， 并未达到真实销售的目的。
首先，就企业资产证券化的结构来看，证券公司或基金管理公司子公司依据《证 券公司及基金管理公司子公司资产证券化业务管理规定》（以下简称“管理规定”）， 设立资产支持专项计划。由于“专项计划”仅为证券公司或基金管理公司子公司的一 个客户理财项目，并不具备独立的法律主体资格，因此，其无法作为基础资产受让人 而以自身名义受让基础资产。
其次，由于受分业经营限制，根据证监会的法规框架，证券公司或基金管理公司 子公司设立的专项计划仅仅借用了特殊目的载体的概念来推广资产证券化业务，实践 中通过引入信托机制以解决资产的真实出售与破产隔离问题也存在很多待解决的法律 问题。
General introduction to trust margin trading
Introduction
Ask any restructuring professional about the greatest challenge in restructuring and reorganising a business group with operations in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and he/she is likely to say that it is virtually impossible to take over control of the PRC operating subsidiaries without the co-operation of the existing PRC legal representatives.
China is one of the largest manufacturers and consumers of iron and steel products. The steel industry in China has developed over several decades into the biggest in the world. China accounts for nearly 50% of world steel production. It has been driven by rapid modernization of its economy, construction, infrastructure and manufacturing industries.
1 房地产开发企业破产重整利益平衡实务分析 作者：卓纬律师事务所 · 张思明 摘要：房地产开发企业破产重整涉及购房者、建筑商、银行以及企业职工等诸多 债权人的利益，存在不同性质权利优先权之利益博弈，相关法律及司法解释与破产法 规定亦有不衔接之处。本文以房地产开发企业破产存在的社会风险为逻辑起点，坚持 社会责任本位理念，从保护购房者利益的视角研究房地产开发企业破产重整利益平衡 机制，对可能或者已经发生破产原因但又有挽救希望的房地产开发企业，通过对各方 利害关系人的利益协调，制定具有可操作性的重整计划，以使危困企业顺利获得更 生。 关键词：房地产开发企业；破产重整；利益平衡 房地产开发企业破产重整是一个相对复杂的系统工程，需要平衡多方利益，制定 周密的重整计划才能使重整顺利进行，根据破产重整申请受理时企业开发项目的不同 状况，合理保护购房者的利益。各方利益关系主体还应本着社会本位原则，积极化解 重整实务中出现的矛盾纠纷。 一、 房地产开发企业破产风险分析 房地产开发企业破产具有不同于一般企业破产的特殊性，其破产涉及到银行等金 融机构、投资人、建筑商、被拆迁人、购房者等诸多主体利益。如果出现房地产开发 企业的大规模破产，将会影响金融秩序的稳定，甚者导致如美国的次贷危机而诱发金 2 融风险。