. . . In such circumstances, sealing the indictment “would undermine the purpose of having a statute of limitations at all.”
Introduction
Over the years, I’ve heard lots of people say, “Bankruptcy abuse is a huge problem,” as a self-evident and undeniable proposition.
But here’s the thing. Debtors who try to abuse the bankruptcy system rarely get away with it. That’s because there are too many gatekeepers—and no debtor can fool them all!
The gatekeepers are debtor’s counsel, creditors and their attorneys, U.S. Trustees, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.
This is the first of a multi-part series of articles on how the gatekeepers prevent abuse. This article focuses on debtor’s attorney.
A Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court’s recent appellate decision in Blumsack v. Harrington (In re Blumsack) leaves the door open for those employed in the cannabis industry to seek bankruptcy relief where certain conditions are met.
引言
自2022年5月起，上市公司“携带”未到期可转债进入预重整或重整程序的案例逐步在A股视野中涌现。截至目前，重整计划成功执行并顺利处置可转债违约风险的只有*ST正邦（002157）和*ST全筑（603030）两个案例。作为一种上市公司破产重整领域的新兴产品，由于可转债具有债权性、股权性和二级市场可交易等特点，较重整中的其他普通债权更具特殊性，给上市公司破产重整提出了“新课题”，应当在重整中进行定制化处理。
可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式保持了其作为金融工具“进可攻，退可守”的特点，债券持有人可以选择到期兑付、转卖或转股。因此，重整方案设计中最为核心的是保护可转债原持有人在可转债产品项下的合法权利。通常做法为保留可转债持有人一定期限的交易及转股权利，利用可转债的特殊规则为持有人做好权利保护衔接，实现上市公司与持有人的利益共赢。
本文谨从可转债的特殊性及权利保护措施、实践中主要案例总结及重整方案设计要点等三个方面展开，对存续可转债在上市公司破产重整中的处理方式进行总结和探讨。
一、可转债的特殊性及权利保护
（一）可转债的特殊性
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a valuable tool for non-US entities going through foreign insolvency proceedings when they have assets located in the United States. Chapter 15 can protect the value of US assets by granting a stay of actions against those assets during the concurrent administration of a complementary US insolvency process with that of the original foreign insolvency proceeding.
Over the years, I’ve heard lots of people say, “Bankruptcy abuse is a huge problem,” as a self-evident and undeniable proposition.
But here’s the thing. Debtors who try to abuse the bankruptcy system rarely get away with it. That’s because there are too many gatekeepers—and no debtor can fool them all!
The gatekeepers are debtor’s counsel, creditors and their attorneys, U.S. Trustees, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.
This is the third of a multi-part series of articles on how gatekeepers prevent abuse. This article focuses on U.S. Trustees.
We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
In 2019, Congress enacted the Small Business Reorganization Act, which created subchapter V within chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress’ intent was to create a more cost-efficient and streamlined restructuring process for small businesses by modifying certain provisions of chapter 11 for debtors with claims below a specific debt cap. In particular, because creditors typically have smaller claims against these small businesses, the new subchapter takes into account the likelihood that there will be no or minimal meaningful creditor participation.
Over the years, I’ve heard lots of people say, “Bankruptcy abuse is a huge problem,” as a self-evident and undeniable proposition.
But here’s the thing. Debtors who try to abuse the bankruptcy system rarely get away with it. That’s because there are too many gatekeepers—and no debtor can fool them all!
The gatekeepers are debtor’s counsel, creditors and their attorneys, U.S. Trustees, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.
1. Introducción
En la edición de este mes de marzo destacamos:
La Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona de 20 de diciembre de 2023 que considera irrescindible la hipoteca constituida por la concursada a favor de la AEAT incluso cuando lo que se garantiza es la deuda de un tercero, y no la propia.