Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s September 15, 2008 bankruptcy was an event of default under thousands of derivatives contracts to which a Lehman entity was a party and for which Lehman Brothers Holdings was the guarantor. This default entitled the vast majority of Lehman’s counterparties to terminate these contracts, and almost all were terminated.
As we count down the days until the New Year, we are reminded of the momentous year we will leave behind us on December 31. While memorable for many things, 2009 may long be remembered as a year of record corporate insolvency. In 2009, General Motors, CIT, Chrysler, and Thornburg Mortgage filed four of the ten largest corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history. Equally notable are the number of corporate filings made in 2009.
In a recent Hunton & Williams client alert, we discussed some of the issues relating to the termination of credit default swap agreements that were pending before the Lehman bankruptcy court, including the enforceability of so-called “flip clauses.” (“Swap Termination and the Subordination of Termination Payments in the Lehman Bankruptcy,” December 2009.) Recently, the court ruled for Lehman on many of these issues. The court’s ruling (Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
Although courts are generally reluctant to equitably subordinate claims of non-insiders, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana recently did just that to the claims of a non-insider lender based on overreaching and self-serving conduct in Credit Suisse v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In Re Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC), Case No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 13, 2009).
Judge Drain’s recent bench rulings in Momentive Performance Materials in 2014 generated a great deal of controversy in the distressed debt world. Distressed investors, lenders, and commentators have questioned whether the Momentive rulings will lead to an industry trend in which debtors seek to cram down their secured lenders to take advantage of the ability to do so at below market interest rates.
A main focus of the anticipated reform of the law governing limited liability companies by the draft Act on the Modernization of the Law on Limited Liability Companies and the Prevention of Abuse (generally referred to as the “MoMiG” or “Modernization Act”) is the new set of rules relating to shareholder debt financings.
The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.
Restructuring companies in respect of which there exists a significant credit default swaps (CDS) market adds an additional level of complexity which the debtor and all stakeholders should consider and assess early on in the process, as it could determine the success or failure of a restructuring plan.
Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.
On 31 December 2013, Banco de Portugal issued instruction no. 32/2013 implementing new rules on the identification and flagging of distress debt financing restructures (“Instruction 32/2013”) and revoking its instruction no.18/2012 on the same matter.
Instruction 32/2013 is applicable to credit institutions and to financial institutions with lending activity as well as branches of credit institutions with head offices outside the EU (“Institutions”).