The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.
Earlier today (September 15, 2008), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Holdings), the corporate parent of the fourth largest investment bank in the United States, filed for Chapter 11 protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. As of writing, neither Holdings’ broker-dealer subsidiaries (including Lehman Brothers, Inc. [Lehman NY]) nor other subsidiaries (including Neuberger Berman Holdings, LLC, its asset management subsidiary) have commenced insolvency proceedings in the United States.
The credit default swap (“CDS”) has never been tested in bankruptcy proceedings on any significant scale, particularly under recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. In part, this is because the CDS market is a very recent phenomenon. CDS market participants also make considerable efforts to avoid holding a credit default swap where the counterparty has gone into bankruptcy.
Nothing is certain in today's financial crisis - except that the legal system will be sorting out the rights and obligations of financial market participants for years to come. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.
Extending credit to risky customers in the automotive industry has increasingly required active and careful management of the prospective sale and the account receivable to assure payment. The news of GM’s, Ford’s and Chrysler’s financial condition, and any likely affect of their bankruptcy on its suppliers, has changed the definition of “credit risk” to include otherwise traditionally “credit-worthy” customers that operate in financially-uncertain industries.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers was a major test of the procedures developed by market participants to address counterparty credit risk and has uncovered deficiencies in risk management policies and their application.
On April 16, General Growth Properties, Inc. and certain of its affiliates (“GGP”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. GGP operates a national network of approximately 200 shopping centers. To the surprise of many, most of GGP’s property-specific SPE subsidiaries (“SPE Debtors”) also filed for bankruptcy.
Although courts are generally reluctant to equitably subordinate claims of non-insiders, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana recently did just that to the claims of a non-insider lender based on overreaching and self-serving conduct in Credit Suisse v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In Re Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC), Case No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 13, 2009).
To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.
To promote equal treatment of creditors, the US Congress has armed debtors with the power to bring suit to recover a variety of pre-bankruptcy transfers. Prominent among these is a debtor’s ability under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to recover constructively fraudulent transfers — i.e., transfers made without fair consideration when a debtor is insolvent.