It has long been the law that creditors are rarely entitled to contractually prohibit a debtor from filing for bankruptcy, whether such restriction is contained in the debt instruments or in the corporate governance documents. In contrast, governance provisions which condition a bankruptcy filing on the vote or consent of certain equity holders that are unaffiliated with any creditor are frequently enforced. Many equity sponsors, for example, wear two hats: they are both shareholders and lenders to their portfolio companies.
InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.
Shareholders who received nearly $8 billion from the Tribune Company leveraged buyout (LBO) do not have to give back that money as a constructive fraudulent transfer. Although the possibility remains that the creditors can recover this money through the pending intentional fraudulent transfer claims, which are much more difficult to prove, the Second Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Code preempts creditors from recovering under state constructive fraud theories when shareholders receive distributions under securities contracts effectuated through financial institutions.
On Saturday, June 28, Puerto Rico’s Governor Padilla signed into effect Puerto Rico’s new bankruptcy law for certain revenue bond issuers. Within 24 hours of the statute’s enactment, two mutual fund complexes owning approximately $1.7 billion in bonds of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) filed a complaint in the federal district court for Puerto Rico, seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the fledgling legislation.
When a debtor rejects an executory contract, Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a licensee of intellectual property to retain certain rights under the rejected contract. An important question arises, therefore, whether a particular agreement indeed involves a license. In a recent decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the definition of a license as “a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.” In re Spansion, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26131, *7 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
The Bankruptcy Court held a status conference in the Harrisburg Chapter 9 earlier today. The principal purpose of the hearing was for the court to set a schedule for objections to Harrisburg’s chapter 9 eligibility. Objections to eligibility and supporting briefs are to be filed by October 28, a response by the City Council is to be filed by November 7, and replies on behalf of the objecting parties are to be filed by November 12. The judge made it clear that the City Council has the burden of showing eligibility. Th
In French v. Linn Energy, L.L.C. (In re Linn Energy, L.L.C.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the scope of Bankruptcy Code Section 510(b), settling on an expansive reading of the Section, holding that a claim for “deemed dividends” should be subordinated.
The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”
A recent bankruptcy court decision from the influential Southern District of New York permitted a debtor to reject executory contracts with midstream gathers as an exercise of sound business judgment. In In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation, the court issued an advisory ruling in which it determined that certain provisions of the rejected contracts were not covenants that ran with the land, and thus could be rejected thereby relieving the debtor of a financial hardship.
The Supreme Court has spoken once again on the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, adding to the understanding derived from Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., 573 U.S.