報載曾為全球第二大的加密貨幣交易所FTX於2022年11月聲請美國破產法第11章破產重組，其破產重組計畫終於在2024年10月獲得美國德拉瓦州破產法院法官核准。受益於加密貨幣價值的大幅提升及美國國稅局同意減少稅捐債權之數額，FTX的用戶可獲得以破產當時加密貨幣的美元計價之賠償，若以此計算，大部分的用戶均可取回全額賠償及部分利息。
雖然仍有用戶認為加密貨幣現在之價值遠高於FTX破產時的價值，若無法返還用戶原本持有之加密貨幣，根本不算是全額賠償。但無論如何，在破產程序中債權人能獲得全額賠償及部分利息，是相當少見的狀況。
■美為讓債務人重獲新生，對稅捐債權保障可有所退讓
This week’s TGIF examines a recent decision where the Federal Court considered when a proof of debt would be ‘admitted’ within the meaning of section 563B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and therefore attract the statutory entitlement to interest.
Key takeaways
本文结合了笔者承办的2023年度“全国破产经典案例”哈尔滨工大高新技术产业开发股份有限公司等五家公司破产重整案和近年来约50家退市公司重整的理论分析和实践经验，探讨退市公司独有的重整价值、重整路径及实务中的常见争议疑难问题，现采撷文章要点，抛砖引玉供各界同仁研究探讨。
一、引言
2024年4月，国务院出台《关于加强监管防范风险推动资本市场高质量发展的若干意见》，中国证券监督管理委员会出台《关于严格执行退市制度的意见》，证券交易所修订《上海证券交易所股票上市规则》《深圳证券交易所股票上市规则》等业务规则（以下合称“国九条及相关配套文件”）。“国九条及相关配套文件”旨在加强对市场的监管，倡导退市常态化。在2019年以前，每年退市数量几乎都在个位数；自2019年开始，上市公司退市逐渐进入加速状态，2020年退市数量达到20家，2021年退市数量达到23家，2022年退市数量达到50家，2023年退市数量达到46家，2024年度截至9月6日已经退市49家企业。上市公司退市后的出路作为整体性退市制度设计的一环，退市公司破产重整逐渐引发学界和市场的关注。
A recentPwC reportfound that there has been a slight rise in companies availing of the Small Company Administrative Rescue Process (“SCARP”).
SCARP made up 6% of corporate insolvencies in Q2 2024, up from 3% in the previous quarter.
However, overall, the numbers availing of this insolvency option remain low, which is notable given that insolvencies generally are increasing.
Insolvency Trends
مقدمة
في إطار التزام دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة بتعزيز العدالة الاجتماعية وترسيخ المبادئ الإنسانية، تم تحديث التشريعات المتعلقة بحماية الشخص الطبيعي في حالات الإعسار. هذه الخطوة تعكس رغبة الإمارات في إيجاد حلول مرنة للمشكلات المالية التي تواجه الأفراد، بما يحفظ حقوقهم وكرامتهم، ويدعم الاستقرار الأسري والاقتصادي.
ما هو الإعسار؟
مقدمة
في خطوة مبتكرة نحو ترسيخ مبدأ العدالة الاجتماعية، أعلنت دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة عن إلغاء عقوبة الحبس للمدينين المعسرين. يهدف هذا القرار إلى حماية الأفراد غير القادرين على سداد ديونهم بسبب ظروف خارجة عن إرادتهم، ويشكل انعكاسًا واضحًا لالتزام الإمارات بتطبيق أسس حقوق الإنسان والتسامح. في هذا المقال، سنستعرض تفاصيل هذا القرار وتأثيراته القانونية والاجتماعية على الأفراد والمجتمع.
من هو المدين المعسر؟
In Harrington v Purdue Pharma,1 the United States Supreme Court held that so-called “non-consensual third-party releases” were not permitted in restructuring plans proposed under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. A “third-party release” arises where creditors are asked to vote on a restructuring plan or scheme which not only proposes to release the debtor company (i.e. the company that has petitioned for bankruptcy or is proposing the scheme) from all liability but to also release other third parties from any associated liability.
Situations Partner Kai Zeng in London Kai Zeng, who advises on cross-border restructurings and special situations matters, has joined the firm in London as a partner in the Restructuring Department and Finance and Hybrid Capital & Special Situations groups.
Kai advises sponsors, debtors, creditors and strategic investors on restructurings of stressed and distressed businesses, as well as hedge and credit funds, investments banks and private equity firms on their review and diligence of European investment opportunities in par, stressed and distressed transactions.
This article explains why the purchase of a shell company should be avoided today and even more so in the future under the new law, and that the formation of a new company is preferable when setting up a business (start-up).
At the end of this article, the possible effects of the revision of the law on legitimate transactions with company shares will also be discussed.
Seeking sound legal advice is therefore worthwhile both when founding a new company and when taking over an operating company.
The voluntary dissolution of a Malta company is a significant legal process that should not be underestimated. It requires a thorough thought process, previous year compliance obligations to be met, and strict adherence to legal obligations. Failure to do so will result in serious consequences for the directors, shareholders and liquidator alike, especially if the liquidator is not vigilant in the manner in which the liquidator's role and responsibilities are carried out.