If a creditor is holding property of a party that files bankruptcy, is it “exercising control over” such property (and violating the automatic stay) by refusing the debtor’s turnover demands? According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no – instead, the stay under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code only applies to affirmative acts that disturb the status quo as of the filing date. In other words, the mere retention of property of a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay.

Key Contacts:

On 18 January 2021, the Court of Appeal in Md Isa Bujang v CIMB Bank Berhad dismissed a bankrupt’s appeal against a High Court decision that struck out his claim for, inter alia, damages of RM22,445,601.64 against CIMB Bank Berhad for delay in the auction of his property charged to the Bank. The Bank was represented by our Partner, Claudia Cheah and Senior Associate, Aufa Radzi.

Key points 

The High Court has dismissed a strike out application in respect of a claim brought under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 1986”) in respect of an alleged transaction defrauding creditors, holding that it is not necessary to prove a freestanding connection between the defendant and England, separate from the litigation itself, in order to obtain relief: Suppipat v Narongdej [2020] EWHC 3191 (Comm).

Alerts and Updates

The Court’s decision provides greater certainty for creditors who passively retain estate property that they obtained pre-petition.

On January 14, 2021, the Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton that a creditor does not violate the automatic stay by merely retaining possession of the debtor’s property after a bankruptcy filing. The City of Chicago routinely impounded vehicles owned by drivers with outstanding parking tickets and other fines. The City refused to release the impounded vehicles after the owner of the vehicle filed bankruptcy. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the City’s retention of the vehicles violated the automatic stay.

In Re Ando Credit Limited [2020] HKCFI 2775, the Honourable Mr Justice Harris appointed provisional liquidators over a Hong Kong- incorporated company, in an application  that broke ground as the first of its kind, made  with  the express purpose of  seeking  recognition  in  the Mainland.

In the recent judgment of the ECSC in the matter of Sumner Group Mining Limited v Zica S.A (BVIHC (Com) 2020/0171, Walkers successfully represented the respondent in defending an application to set aside a statutory demand. Jack J provided helpful guidance on the legal principles in circumstances where it is alleged that a statutory demand had been served improperly for a collateral purpose.

The applicant sought to set aside a statutory demand on the basis of either:

In a year quite unlike any other, the landscape of Canadian restructuring law saw significant developments in 2020. The COVID-19 crisis put novel issues before the courts, challenged businesses in unforeseen ways and saw various supports and concessions offered to struggling businesses from governments and creditors. Ultimately, while the supports and concessions enabled many businesses to avoid insolvency proceedings in 2020, many others sought the protection of an insolvency filing, with industries such as the retail industry particularly impacted.

This article was originally published in Law360. Any opinions in this article are not those of Winston & Strawn or its clients. The opinions in this article are the authors' opinions only.

In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. 50509 Marine LLC et al.[1] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. can recover an employer's defined benefit pension plan termination liability--often millions of dollars--from controlled group members that did not even exist when the contributing employer liquidated years earlier.[2]

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that loans incurred by a debtor to pay university tuition were “qualified education loans” under the Bankruptcy Code and thus were not dischargeable.

In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit rejected the debtor’s arguments that: