In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.
Background
In a recent case arising out of the bankruptcy of the Yellowstone Mountain Club, a private ski club for the ultrawealthy, Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff needed the bankruptcy court’s permission to bring post-petition claims against the chair of Yellowstone’s Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”).
Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits action that would deprive individual bondholders of the right to receive principal and interest, has taken center stage of late with rulings on the scope of its applicability. But another provision of Section 316 of the TIA drives in the opposite direction, and is equally fundamental to the architecture of indenture debt as commonly issued in this country. Section 316(a)(1) prescribes the default rule that a majority of bondholders have the power to direct the remedial actions of the trustee.
Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation1shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.
Virtually all public indentures contain provisions allowing the issuer to cure ambiguities and make other technical changes to the debt documentation without debtholder consent. When the purported ambiguities have substantive consequences, however, issuers may not be able to get away with an amendment that lacks debtholder approval. InGSO Coastline Credit Partners L.P. v. Global A&T Electronics Ltd. (NY App. Div. 1st Dept. May 3, 2016), a New York lower court bought into a “cure of ambiguity” argument and on that basis granted a motion to dismiss.
With the current interest being focused on Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, this may be a good time to examine the differing rights of noteholders under an indenture governed by the TIA and the rights of lenders under credit agreements governed by New York law.
A recent case out of the Southern District of New York, Citibank, NA, London Branch v. Norske Skogindustrier ASA(S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2016), once again illustrates the difficulty of obtaining injunctive relief against prospective indenture violations of a financially troubled issuer.
The Facts
A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.
As you know, the last two years have seen a somewhat improved, but by no means robust, business climate. At the same time, structural shifts in the law firm business model have been both highly publicized and memorably demonstrated.