In the May 2017 issue of Debt Dialogue, we discussed the recent decision by Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S.
The Bottom Line:
In a unanimous decision (with Justice Kennedy not participating), the Supreme Court issued a decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012), (“RadLAX”) in which it held that section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a debtor to “cram down” a plan of reorganization that provides for the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens at auction without permitting the lienholder to credit bid at such auction.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Merit Management Group L.P. v. FTI Consulting Inc. to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.
The Bottom Line:
By now, both indenture trustees and offices of the U.S. Trustee around the country are undoubtedly familiar with the Southern District of New York’s 2014 opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 508 B.R. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Lehman II), finding that individual committee members must establish a “substantial contribution” to the case under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code before the payment of their fees will be approved as part of a Chapter 11 plan. In the years since the Lehman II decision, however, U.S.
On November 13, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors in Chapter 11 (collectively, “Lehman”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of procedures (the “Procedures”) for the assumption and assignment of derivative contracts not yet terminated by its various counterparties, as well confirmation of Lehman’s right to enter into settlement agreements for the termination of derivative contracts that have been terminated by its counterparties post-petition.
In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.
Background
A recent case in the Southern District of New York, U.S. Bank, NA v. T.D. Bank, NA, applied the so-called Rule of Explicitness to the allocation of recoveries among creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy context, this rule requires a clear and unambiguous intention to turn over post-petition interest to senior creditors at the expense of junior creditors. The court in this case found the requisite documentary clarity to pay post-petition interest ahead of the distribution of principal.
In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.
Background