A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.
A recent case in New York State Supreme Court, One Williams Street Capital Management LP v. U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 15, 2015), affords a useful opportunity to review the applicability and scope of §13-107 of the New York General Obligations Law, which provides that a transfer of a bond “vests in the transferee all claims or demands of the transferrer.” The court observed that §13-107 extends to all claims, whether in contract or in tort, including fraud.
As you know, the last two years have seen a somewhat improved, but by no means robust, business climate. At the same time, structural shifts in the law firm business model have been both highly publicized and memorably demonstrated.
In February 2017, Judge Katherine Polk Faila of the Southern District of New York issued a bench ruling1 in Cumulus Media Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017), in which she found that a proposed exchange of senior notes for revolver commitments would violate certain covenants of the issuer’s credit agreement protecting the term loan lenders.
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In the May 2017 issue of Debt Dialogue, we discussed the recent decision by Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S.
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In a unanimous decision (with Justice Kennedy not participating), the Supreme Court issued a decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012), (“RadLAX”) in which it held that section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a debtor to “cram down” a plan of reorganization that provides for the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens at auction without permitting the lienholder to credit bid at such auction.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Merit Management Group L.P. v. FTI Consulting Inc. to resolve a circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.
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By now, both indenture trustees and offices of the U.S. Trustee around the country are undoubtedly familiar with the Southern District of New York’s 2014 opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 508 B.R. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Lehman II), finding that individual committee members must establish a “substantial contribution” to the case under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code before the payment of their fees will be approved as part of a Chapter 11 plan. In the years since the Lehman II decision, however, U.S.