In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.

Background

A recent case in the Southern District of New York, U.S. Bank, NA v. T.D. Bank, NA, applied the so-called Rule of Explicitness to the allocation of recoveries among creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy context, this rule requires a clear and unambiguous intention to turn over post-petition interest to senior creditors at the expense of junior creditors. The court in this case found the requisite documentary clarity to pay post-petition interest ahead of the distribution of principal.

In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.

Background

Funds Talk: February 2017

Topics covered in this issue include:

In a recent case arising out of the bankruptcy of the Yellowstone Mountain Club, a private ski club for the ultrawealthy, Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff needed the bankruptcy court’s permission to bring post-petition claims against the chair of Yellowstone’s Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”).

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits action that would deprive individual bondholders of the right to receive principal and interest, has taken center stage of late with rulings on the scope of its applicability. But another provision of Section 316 of the TIA drives in the opposite direction, and is equally fundamental to the architecture of indenture debt as commonly issued in this country. Section 316(a)(1) prescribes the default rule that a majority of bondholders have the power to direct the remedial actions of the trustee.

Overview

In Hilal K. Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc., Navient Solutions, LLC, Navient Credit Finance Corporation, Case No. 20-1981 (2d Cir. 2021), the Second Circuit affirmed the opinion of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York, which held that private student loans are not excepted from discharge under Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge “an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii).

Background

Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation¹shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.

On March 27, the president signed into law Phase 3 of the federal stimulus program, called the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, or CARES Act. Title I of the act, titled the Keeping American Workers Paid and Employed Act (KAWPEA), directs, among other amounts, $349 billion to small businesses as part of an expansion of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 7(a) loan program under a new paycheck protection loan program (PPP) as well as $10 billion through an expansion to the SBA’s Section 7(b) economic injury disaster loan (EIDL) program.

Virtually all public indentures contain provisions allowing the issuer to cure ambiguities and make other technical changes to the debt documentation without debtholder consent. When the purported ambiguities have substantive consequences, however, issuers may not be able to get away with an amendment that lacks debtholder approval. InGSO Coastline Credit Partners L.P. v. Global A&T Electronics Ltd. (NY App. Div. 1st Dept. May 3, 2016), a New York lower court bought into a “cure of ambiguity” argument and on that basis granted a motion to dismiss.