On June 23rd, the First Circuit addressed the priority of claims asserted by senior noteholders and junior noteholders of debt issued by an insolvent bank. It affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the parties did not intend for the senior noteholders to receive post-petition interest payments prior to the junior noteholders receiving a distribution. In re: Bank of New England Corporation, Debtor.  

On November 10th, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association announced that its Americas Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee resolved that a bankruptcy credit event has occurred in respect of Ambac Financial Group, Inc. An auction will be held for Ambac Financial Group for which ISDA will publish the auction terms. ISDA Press Release.  

On April 26th, the Eleventh Circuit held that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act prohibits a federal district court from enjoining the FDIC. A trial court had initially imposed a TRO against a failing bank prohibiting it from taking any action with respect to $1 billion worth of mortgage proceeds it held in trust for petitioner, Bank of America, who held legal title. When the FDIC was appointed receiver, the FDIC moved to dissolve the TRO. The trial court refused converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction.

In a recent holding that a creditor may collect, on an unsecured basis, post-petition attorneys’ fees under an otherwise enforceable pre-petition contract, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed a similar ruling by the Ninth Circuit earlier this year, adding to a conflict among the circuits on this issue.

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

In Sposato v. First Mariner Bank, 2013 WL 1308582 (D. Md.

On November 4th, the Federal Bankruptcy Court granted the SIPC Trustee's motion to establish procedures for the issuance of subpoenas for document production and depositions in connection with the SIPC Trustee's independent investigation into the business and affairs of MF Global. Access to documents produced by witnesses and attendance at examinations will be limited to the SIPC Trustee and his professionals. The SIPC, SEC and CFTC will have access to the discovery upon the execution of confidentiality agreements.

On June 7th, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment dismissing Chapter 13 debtors' claims against Wells Fargo, which holds debtors' mortgages. Debtors alleged that Wells Fargo violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions by recording in its internal records the fees it incurred to file its proof of claim. The Eleventh Circuit held that Wells Fargo did not violate the automatic stay because it had not collected or attempt to collect those fees. Similarly, a claim based on Wells Fargo's failure to disclose the fees was not yet ripe for action.

On November 1st, the Treasury Department provided an update regarding the federal government's involvement with AIG. AIG will use the proceeds from its sale of one unit and the IPO from a second to repay the loan extended to AIG by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and to repurchase a substantial amount of the FRBNY's preferred interests in certain AIG subsidiaries. AIG will then draw up to $22 billion in remaining Troubled Asset Relief Program funds from the Treasury Department to restructure its governmental obligations.

On April 12th, the Sixth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 debtor has standing to bring an avoidance action even when the bankruptcy trustee does not. It further held that the defendant mortgage company perfected its lien by equitably converting the lien on plaintiff's manufactured home to one for real property when the state court entered judgment on defendant's lis pendens claim. Since that order was entered during the 90 day preference period, the lien was avoidable.