Only a handful of courts have had an opportunity to address the ramifications of rejection of a trademark license since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit handed down its landmark decision in Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Manuf., LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). A bankruptcy appellate panel for the First Circuit recently did so in Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC (In re Tempnology LLC), 559 B.R. 809 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).

Secured lenders have welcomed a ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the chapter 11 cases of Aéropostale, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Aéropostale"). In In re Aéropostale, Inc., 2016 BL 279439 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2016), Bankruptcy Judge Sean H.

On April 7, 2016, Quicksilver Resources Inc. ("Quicksilver") announced that it closed the sale of its U.S. assets for $245 million to BlueStone Natural Resources II ("BlueStone") in connection with Quicksilver's bankruptcy cases and pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement that was approved by Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in January 2016.

Since the development of the doctrine of equitable mootness nearly a quarter century ago, courts have struggled to apply it in a way that strikes the appropriate balance between the need to ensure the finality and certainty of a chapter 11 plan for stakeholders, on the one hand, and the need to exercise the court’s jurisdiction and honor the right to appellate review, on the other. In JPMCC 2007-C1 Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Props. Inc. (In re Transwest Resort Props., Inc.), 2015 BL 302540 (9th Cir. Sept.

In Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision that transfers of trademark patents were avoidable under section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Minnesota state law because they were made with the intent to defraud creditors.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made headlines when it ruled that creditors' state law fraudulent transfer claims arising from the 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") of Tribune Co. ("Tribune") were preempted by the safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. In that ruling, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 946 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 568 (U.S. Apr.

U.S. courts have a long-standing tradition of recognizing or enforcing the laws and court rulings of other nations as an exercise of international "comity." It has been generally understood that recognition of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding under chapter 15 is a prerequisite to a U.S. court enforcing, under the doctrine of comity, an order or judgment entered in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding or a provision in foreign bankruptcy law applicable to a debtor in such a proceeding.

In the latest chapter of more than a decade of litigation involving efforts to recover fictitious profits paid to certain customers of Bernard Madoff's defunct brokerage firm as part of the largest Ponzi scheme in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 976 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.

"Safe harbors" in the Bankruptcy Code designed to insulate non-debtor parties to financial contracts from the consequences that normally ensue when a counterparty files for bankruptcy have been the focus of a considerable amount of scrutiny as part of evolving developments in the pandemic-driven downturn. One of the most recent developments concerning this issue in the courts was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in connection with the landmark chapter 11 cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("Lehman") and its affiliates.

A basic tenet of bankruptcy law, premised on the legal separateness of a debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy and the estate created upon a bankruptcy filing, is that prepetition debts are generally treated differently than debts incurred by the estate, which are generally treated as priority administrative expenses. However, this seemingly straightforward principle is sometimes difficult to apply in cases where a debt technically "arose" or "was incurred" prepetition, but does not became payable until sometime during the bankruptcy case. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S.