In its highly anticipated Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp. decision,[1] the U.S.
Key Points
Over the past 21 years, two U.S. district court judges in the Southern District of New York have held that the avoidance powers conferred on a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession under the Bankruptcy Code do not apply to pre-bankruptcy transfers made by a debtor outside the United States. However, a U.S. bankruptcy court judge in the same district recently reached the opposite conclusion in Weisfelner v. Blavatnik (In re Lyondell), 543 B.R. 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). In Lyondell, bankruptcy judge Robert E.
In Del. Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), 527 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015), the bankruptcy court ruled that, even though a chapter 11 debtor repaid certain bonds prior to maturity, a "make-whole" premium was not payable under the plain terms of the bond indenture because automatic acceleration of the debt triggered by the debtor's chapter 11 filing was not a "voluntary" repayment.
The Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (the "Fund") was established in 1985 to provide timely relief in the form of an ex gratia payment to eligible employees affected by the insolvency of their employers, for example where employees' severance payments are withheld pending winding-up proceedings. Section 16(2) of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (the "Ordinance") provides that the Commissioner for Labour shall not make payment out of the Fund of amounts exceeding certain caps.
Although the automatic stay contained in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code theoretically extends worldwide, enforcing it against international creditors, particularly sovereigns, can present practical problems in its application. The chapter 11 cases of Kumtor Gold Company CJSC and Kumtor Operating Company CJSC (collectively, "Kumtor") pending before Judge Lisa Beckerman in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Case No. 21-11051) have been testing the practical application of the automatic stay's global reach since the commencement of the cases in late May 2021.
In cases under both chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and its repealed predecessor, section 304, U.S. bankruptcy courts have routinely recognized and enforced orders of foreign bankruptcy and insolvency courts as a matter of international comity. However, U.S. bankruptcy courts sometimes disagree over the precise statutory authority for granting such relief, because the provisions of chapter 15 are not particularly clear on this point in all cases.
In Hafen v. Adams (In re Hafen), 616 B.R. 570 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2020), a bankruptcy appellate panel from the Tenth Circuit ("BAP") held that the bankruptcy court is the only court with subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether a claim or cause of action is property of a debtors' bankruptcy estate. As a consequence, the BAP held that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by permitting a state court to determine whether creditors had "standing" to sue third-party recipients of allegedly fraudulent transfers.
The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell assets of the bankruptcy estate "free and clear" of "any interest" in the property asserted by a non-debtor is an important tool designed to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California recently examined whether such interests include "successor liability" claims that might otherwise be asserted against the purchaser of a debtor's assets. In In re Catalina Sea Ranch, LLC, 2020 WL 1900308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
In Short
The Situation. In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether bankruptcy court orders conclusively denying relief from the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay are immediately appealable.
The Result. On January 14, 2020, the Court unanimously ruled that an order conclusively resolving a motion for relief from the automatic stay was immediately appealable, such that a later-filed appeal was untimely and must be dismissed.