In the spirit of the season, we’re (re)visited by Doron Kenter, a member of the Weil Bankruptcy Blog’s O.G. Editorial Board (and, as far as we can tell, still holder of the dubious distinction of having published the most posts for us).
Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, ruled that the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, does not shield transferees from liability simply because a particular transaction was routed through a financial intermediary—so-called “conduit transactions.”
In chapter 11 reorganizations, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed” (commonly known as the bar date). For a creditor or interest holder to be subject to this bar date, they must have received notice to satisfy due process. A known creditor, one that is reasonably ascertainable, must receive “actual notice.” Simply receiving a court-approved bar date notice from the debtor is enough to satisfy this requirement for due process.
We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)
Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (KEIPs) often are the subject of intense interest, either because a distressed company’s management is focused on developing such programs to retain valuable talent during a time of great uncertainty within its organization or because certain creditor constituencies or parties in interest take issue with the payments a debtor intends to make under the programs.
The power of a debtor or trustee to avoid preferential transfers that benefit certain creditors over others is critical to achieving one of the primary tenets of the Bankruptcy Code – the equality of treatment among all creditors. This ability to recover preferences prevents a debtor from favoring certain creditors over others by transferring property in the time leading up to a bankruptcy filing. Although these preference powers are broad, they are restrained by certain conditions, including a minimum threshold on amounts that can be avoided.
Venue has long been a contentious topic highlighted by cases such as Enron and WorldCom to the more recent venue battle in Caesars. Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas addressed this issue, and declined to transfer a pending bankruptcy case to the District of Delaware where cases involving the debtor’s indirect parent company and other affiliates were pending.
When is a claim contingent? When is a claim subject to a bona fide dispute and who has the burden of proof? When is a claim against a person? When is a claim too small to count? When is an alleged debtor generally not paying his debts as they come due? Are we there yet?
Claims estimation can be an important tool for a chapter 11 debtor, particularly to pave the way for proposing a chapter 11 plan. How a bankruptcy court estimates wrongful death and personal injury tort claims (which have a jury trial right) is an interesting issue that was recently discussed by the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California in In re North American Health Care, Inc.
When it comes to releases, plan proponents generally agree the broader the better. But when plan proponents include far reaching and all-encompassing language in hopes of securing a release for every possible claim under the sun, they sometimes overlook the very claims for which they may actual want a release. This was the case in a recent decision,