"Cramdown" chapter 11 plans, under which a bankruptcy court confirms a plan over the objection of a class of creditors, are relatively common. Less common are the subset of cramdown plans known as "cram-up" chapter 11 plans. These plans are referred to as such because they typically involve plans of reorganization that are accepted by junior creditors and then "crammed up" to bind objecting senior creditors.

The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).

In Short

The Situation: A liquidator can reject a "double proof" for what is, in substance, the same debt as another accepted proof of debt.

The Question: When are liquidators justified in rejecting what could arguably be a double proof?

In December 2018, at its 54th session in Vienna, Working Group V (Insolvency Law) of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) discussed revisions to its Enterprise Group Insolvency: Draft Model Law (the "EGI Model Law") as well as the EGI Model Law’s Guide to Enactment.

Amid the explosion of trading in claims against distressed and bankrupt entities, courts in recent years have issued numerous rulings of interest to both buyers and sellers.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated ruling resolving a long-standing circuit split over the scope of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" provision exempting certain securities transaction payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers. In Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., the unanimous Court held that section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not protect transfers made through a financial institution to a third party regardless of whether the financial institution had a beneficial interest in the transferred property.

The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to sell bankruptcy estate assets "free and clear" of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of "any interest in such property," has generated a fair amount of controversy.

In a highly anticipated decision—HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC v. Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. (In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.), 2017 BL 83510 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2017)—Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed 2016 bankruptcy court rulings authorizing chapter 11 debtor Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. ("Sabine") to reject certain gas gathering and handling agreements.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two rulings in 2016 involving issues of bankruptcy law.

In Weisfelner v. Hofmann (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 2016 BL 241310 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York reversed a 2015 ruling by the bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 11 case of Lyondell Chemical Company (“Lyondell”) that dismissed claims asserted by a chapter 11 plan litigation trustee seeking to avoid as actual fraudulent transfers $6.3 billion in payments made to the former stockholders of Lyondell in connection with its 2007 leveraged buyout (“LBO”) by Basell AF S.C.A. See Weisfelner v.