The Bankruptcy Code creates a rebuttable presumption that a proof of claim is prima facie evidence of the claim's validity and amount. Courts disagree, however, over whether that presumption also applies in a proceeding to determine the secured amount of the creditor's claim. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California weighed in on this issue in In re Bassett, 2019 WL 993302 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019).

The Federal Court of Australia rules that receivers appointed to a company in liquidation are entitled to pay employee entitlements and fees.

In Grasslawn Lodging, LLC v. Transwest Resort Properties Inc. (In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.), 881 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered, in connection with a "cramdown" chapter 11 plan, whether an undersecured creditor's election to be treated as fully secured under section 1111(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code means that the plan must include a due-on-sale clause and whether the section 1129(a)(10) impaired class acceptance requirement applies on a "per plan" or a "per debtor" basis.

In Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 872 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gave an unsecured creditors’ committee an "unconditional right to intervene," within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), in an adversary proceeding commenced during the course of a bankruptcy case.

In Short

The Situation: In cross-border restructuring cases, court-approved insolvency protocols are applied to facilitate communication between U.S. and foreign courts and standardize certain common procedures. The protocols are sometimes adapted to address case-specific issues.

The Result: Case-specific provisions tend to address information-sharing guidelines, claims reconciliation, the management of assets, and dispute resolution.

In Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson), 2017 BL 101650 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the distinction between constitutional mootness (a jurisdictional issue that precludes court review of an appeal) and equitable mootness (which allows a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to hear an appeal under certain circumstances). The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an appeal from an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not constitutionally moot because an "actual case or controversy" existed.

In Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quantum Foods, LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re Quantum Foods, LLC), 554 B.R. 729 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016), a Delaware bankruptcy court held in a matter of apparent first impression that a creditor’s allowed administrative expense claim may be set off against the creditor’s potential liability for a preferential transfer. The ruling is an important development for prepetition vendors that continue to provide goods or services to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession.

On July 26, 2016, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) "safe harbor" applicable to constructive fraudulent transfers that are settlement payments made in connection with securities contracts does not protect "transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or the other entities named in section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit."FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 2016 BL 243677.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of any chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic (but not universally accepted) principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to, among other things, add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to “cure” a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a majority of courts have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit endorses this view.