In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

Recent changes in Peruvian insolvency laws1 will now allow financial institutions and insurance company counterparties to close-out and net obligations under derivatives and repurchase agreements with Peruvian financial institutions or insurance companies which become subject to bankruptcy proceedings.

With US Circuit Courts split on the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to release third parties from creditors’ claims without the creditors’ consent, a move known as non-consensual third-party release, the Seventh Circuit recently weighed in the affirmative in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc.1 With the split widening between the circuits on this matter, it seems more likely than ever that the Supreme Court could weigh in on and decide this critical issue to lenders and others.2

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2

HEADLINES

The recent ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana in the Chapter 11 case of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC 1 (“Yellowstone”), which found that a senior secured lender had engaged in “overreaching and predatory lending practices”, suggests an application of lender liability theory from today’s perspective to a transaction that took place before the credit crisis.  

Must creditors holding claims denominated in a foreign currency against a debtor in a US bankruptcy case bear the risk of a postpetition decline in the value of the dollar? In In re Global Power Equipment Group Inc.,1 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware says yes, holding that, pursuant to section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a contested claim denominated in foreign currency must be converted into United States currency as of the petition date instead of a later judgment or breach date.

The Conversion Date Dispute

On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.

The COVID-19 pandemic shook the global real estate and hospitality industry as lockdowns were put in place across the globe. The sudden and unexpected lack of footfall caused revenues in physical centers such as restaurants, shopping malls and hotels to plummet, compounding existing structural inefficiencies and accelerating the speed of change for many businesses.

On May 14, 2009, Judge Allan Gropper of the US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, approved a US$400 million DIP financing package in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) Chapter 11 case. Judge Gropper’s ruling also included approval of GGP’s proposal to use cash flow generated by shopping centers, structured by GGP as bankruptcy remote, special purpose entities, to fund GGP’s ongoing central operations while in bankruptcy.