In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.

Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.

In a recent opinion,1 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York emphasized that foreign confidentiality statutes do not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence — even though the act of production may be considered a criminal offense in a foreign jurisdiction and subject the party to serious consequences, including imprisonment and fines.

Background

In a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re Scotia Development, LLC,1 Judge Richard S. Schmidt denied the motions of several creditors and the State of California seeking transfer of venue from the Southern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, finding that venue was proper in Texas and that California would not be a more convenient forum for the financial restructuring of the debtors.

Background

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

The November/December 2007 issue of Insolvency Notes featured an article highlighting a Manhattan-based federal bankruptcy court's refusal to officially recognize proceedings commenced in the Cayman Islands to liquidate two Bear Stearns-managed hedge funds that collapsed in June of that year.

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

Recent changes in Peruvian insolvency laws1 will now allow financial institutions and insurance company counterparties to close-out and net obligations under derivatives and repurchase agreements with Peruvian financial institutions or insurance companies which become subject to bankruptcy proceedings.

With US Circuit Courts split on the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to release third parties from creditors’ claims without the creditors’ consent, a move known as non-consensual third-party release, the Seventh Circuit recently weighed in the affirmative in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc.1 With the split widening between the circuits on this matter, it seems more likely than ever that the Supreme Court could weigh in on and decide this critical issue to lenders and others.2

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2