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The Times reported yesterday on the continued promotion of an “insolvency avoidance” scheme, despite efforts by the Insolvency Service to close it down. The scheme claims to offer directors of distressed companies a means of avoiding formal liquidation – with the associated scrutiny of their actions and risk of personal liability.

前言

2024年8月26日,苏州市检察院发布了《破产检察监督案件审查指引》(以下简称“《指引》”)。《指引》共计四章六十八条,全面涵盖破产检察监督的基本原则、监督范围、审查要素、监督方式和工作保障等内容。一定程度上,这是全国首例由检察机关根据破产程序的不同环节,详细完善地单独出台破产检察监督相关规定。9月30日,江苏省检察院召开破产领域检察监督工作新闻发布会,通报了全省检察机关开展破产领域检察监督工作的整体情况。

在《指引》出台前,检察机关对破产程序进行检察监督的法律规定较为原则化,缺乏实操层面的系统性规范。近年随着破产重整等案件数量的大幅增加,破产法律制度因缺乏直接、高效的违法行为监督与纠偏机制,导致债权人等破产参与主体的救济机制略显单一,在经济发展和立法实践中呈现出局限性。在各界呼吁拓展外部监督机制的背景下,各地检察机关不断深化提升破产检察监督职能。在本次《指引》发布前,江苏省检察院在2020年即已出台《加强破产案件检察监督工作的指导意见(试行)》,尝试更为规范地对破产程序进行检察监督。通过4年时间的摸索、总结与完善,江苏省检察机关共办理涉破产监督案件1,351件,为本次《指引》的出台奠定了理论与实践基础。

Section 216 Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a person who has been a director of a company at any time in the 12 months before it goes into insolvent liquidation is prohibited for five years from being a director of, or directly or indirectly being concerned in or taking part in, the promotion, formation or management of a company with the same or similar name to the liquidated company (a “prohibited name”). Section 217 imposes personal liability on a director for debts incurred by a company which acts in breach of s 216.

The common law of assignments for benefit of creditors (“ABC”) has been around for centuries.

ABC is a business debtor’s voluntary liquidation tool—typically utilized in cooperation with a major secured creditor.

Historically, ABCs are attractive to debtors and creditors alike as an efficient, mostly out-of-court tool for maximizing the liquidation value of a business—for the benefit of creditors.

The recent revelations about the Atherton Scheme, as reported by The Times, have left many in the legal and business communities surprised. Despite significant government efforts to clamp down on insolvency avoidance practices, this contentious scheme continues to operate, raising serious concerns about its impact on creditors and the integrity of the insolvency regime.

What is the Atherton Scheme?

The decision handed down in Re A Company [2024] EWHC 2656 (Ch) has provided new insight on what constitutes "genuine and serious" cross-claim for the purposes of securing an injunction to restrain presentation of a winding up petition.

Background

Situations Partner Kai Zeng in London Kai Zeng, who advises on cross-border restructurings and special situations matters, has joined the firm in London as a partner in the Restructuring Department and Finance and Hybrid Capital & Special Situations groups.

Kai advises sponsors, debtors, creditors and strategic investors on restructurings of stressed and distressed businesses, as well as hedge and credit funds, investments banks and private equity firms on their review and diligence of European investment opportunities in par, stressed and distressed transactions.

The voluntary dissolution of a Malta company is a significant legal process that should not be underestimated. It requires a thorough thought process, previous year compliance obligations to be met, and strict adherence to legal obligations. Failure to do so will result in serious consequences for the directors, shareholders and liquidator alike, especially if the liquidator is not vigilant in the manner in which the liquidator's role and responsibilities are carried out.

This article explains why the purchase of a shell company should be avoided today and even more so in the future under the new law, and that the formation of a new company is preferable when setting up a business (start-up).

At the end of this article, the possible effects of the revision of the law on legitimate transactions with company shares will also be discussed.

Seeking sound legal advice is therefore worthwhile both when founding a new company and when taking over an operating company.

On 25 October 2024, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled in a ground-breaking judgment in Royal IHC that a WHOA plan may change creditors’ and shareholders’ rights but cannot impose more onerous obligations. More specifically, the lenders cannot be compelled to provide new financing or to accept new terms and still provide new funds under previously committed credit facilities (i.e., undrawn commitments).