Government bonds were long considered a safe investment that offered the potential for high returns. However, after Argentina announced in 2002 that it would no longer service its bond debt and after Greece restructured its sovereign debt in March and December 2012, the question arises as to what investors can do to avoid the significant losses of capital (up to 70% in case of Argentina and over 80% in case of Greece) which almost always accompany sovereign debt restructurings.

The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) continued with its extensive interpretation of the rules for contesting transactions under insolvency law in a judgment dated 21 February 2013 (BGH IX ZR 32/12). In the case before the court, direct shareholder A in company T sold a claim under a loan to B at below par value. Following assignment, T repaid the loan to B at the nominal amount plus interest. Insolvency proceedings were opened around two months later in relation to T’s assets. The BGH’s decision covers three aspects:

A. Bill of the “Law on shielding credit institutions and financial groups against risks and planning their restructuring and winding-up”

In a recent case decided by the Federal Court of Justice (judgment of 15 November 2012 – IX ZR 169 / 11), an energy supplier had entered into a contract with a customer “which should also terminate without notice if the customer makes an application for insolvency or where preliminary insolvency proceedings are initiated or opened based on an application by a creditor”. When the customer was forced to declare insolvency, the energy supplier and the customer’s insolvency administrator entered into a new energy-supply contract at higher rates, subject to a review of the legal position.

Under the new liability standard set out in section 64 sentence 3 of the GmbHG, which was introduced by the Act to Modernise the Law Governing Private Limited Companies and to Combat Abuses (MoMiG), the managing director of a company is liable for payments to shareholders which necessarily cause the insolvency of the company. The requirement for causality of the payment for insolvency and actual determination of insolvency were matters of dispute. The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has now established clarity on both points (judgment of 9 October 2012 II ZR 298 / 11).

On May 10, 2013, Judge Brendan Linehan Shannon of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware rejected an attempt to hold a private equity sponsor liable for its portfolio company’s alleged violations of the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the “WARN Act”) under the “single employer” theory of liability.

On April 22, 2013, Judge Kevin J. Carey of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware allowed a lender’s $23.7 million pre-petition make-whole claim, representing approximately 37% of the outstanding principal of the loan, in the Chapter 11 case of School Specialty, Inc. ¹ In a decision that will win cheers from the lending community, the court enforced the clear terms of the loan agreement over the objection of the Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, holding that the make-whole claim was enforceable under New York law.

BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware confirmed the debtors’ proposed plan of reorganization in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC,¹ declining to “designate” or disallow the votes of several substantial creditors that had entered into a plan support or “lockup” agreement with the debtors after the bankruptcy filing. In a written decision,² the Bankruptcy Court provided important guidance concerning the permissibility of post-petition plan support agreements entered into before the court approves a disclosure statement.

On January 17, 2013, in a lengthy and closely reasoned opinion,¹ Judge Sean Lane of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York authorized American Airlines, Inc. (“American”) to repay $1.3 billion in debt without payment of a make-whole premium over the objection of U.S.

Following the entry into force of the Act to Modernise the Law Governing Private Limited Companies and to Combat Abuses (MoMiG), an atypical silent shareholder must still be treated as a subordinate insolvency creditor for the purposes of section 39(1) no. 5 of the Insolvency Act (InsO) in the event that the company becomes insolvent, assuming the status of the silent shareholder is similar to that of a shareholder in a GmbH (private limited company).