In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.
The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.
T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.
Introduction
On 24 November 2009, ASIC released Consultation Paper 124 which provides guidance for directors on their duty to prevent insolvent trading which is imposed by section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001.
The economic climate over the past two years has seen a growing number of corporate insolvencies. There is also evidence that directors, and particularly directors of small to medium size enterprises, do not fully understand their duty to prevent insolvent trading.
Before 1993, the question of whether a creditor of a corporation being wound up had received an unfair preference from that corporation was determined under section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In 1993, a new Part 5.7B was inserted into the Corporations Act to deal with voidable transactions such as unfair preferences. Since then two lines of divergent judicial authority have developed:
In our Distressed Investor Alert dated December 23, 2009, we wrote that Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, had returned to the public eye in light of the controversial revisions to Rule 2019 (“Revised Rule 2019”)1 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Rules Committee").
Kookmin Bank v Rainy Sky
We have received a number of urgent enquiries about the outcome of the Kookmin Bank case, which was recently decided by the Court of Appeal, in London. The judgment was issued at the end of May 2010 and held, in effect, that refund guarantees -- relating to advance payments of about US$46 million -- were unenforceable by the Buyers to whom the guarantees had been issued. Given the importance of refund guarantees to our shipping and banking clients, we are issuing this summary of the judgment and its general significance.
Summary
The briefing provides an overview of the reorganisation plan introduced by the new Greek Bankruptcy Code. Its purpose is to set out the more important mechanics of the reorganisation plan and examine its more important ramifications within the bankruptcy process.
The new Greek Bankruptcy Code