A discharge in bankruptcy usually discharges a debtor from the debtor’s liabilities. Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, sets forth certain exceptions to this policy, including for “any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.

When serving pleadings in an adversary proceeding, you may want to skip the certified option and go with regular first-class mail, or do both.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004 governs service of process in adversary proceedings. The statute specifically provides for service by first class mail. And while some courts will also permit service of pleadings by certified mail, other courts forbid the use of certified mail.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

We’ve reported here and here on the January 2019 bankruptcy filing by Pacific Gas and Electric (“PG&E”), which was primarily the result of potential liability stemming from catastrophic California wildfires.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to stay in control of their businesses in chapter 11. But the Code also empowers bankruptcy judges to replace a debtor’s management in certain circumstances with an outside trustee. This will happen if either cause exists to expel management or appointing a trustee is in the best interests of creditors, any equity holders, and other interests of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1007. Judges don’t need to hold an evidentiary hearing to appoint a trustee, but the decision to do so must be based on clear and convincing evidence.

We previously discussed Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn’s analysis of the Wagoner Rule in the Feltman v. Kossoff & Kossoff LLP (In re TS Empl., Inc.)case.[1] The bankruptcy trustee (the “Trustee”) had asserted a fraud claim against the debtor’s outside accountant and its principal (the “Defendants”). The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, citing the Wagoner Rule.

Under Section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, property “dealt with” in a confirmed plan is free and clear of the claims and interests of creditors, provided the holder of the claim or interest participated in the bankruptcy case. But what about assets that are not explicitly specified in a disclosure statement? United States District Court Judge Cathy Seibel of the Southern District of New York recently affirmed a decision by Bankruptcy Judge Robert D.

Although it may be difficult to define precisely what an “executory contract” is (with the Bankruptcy Code providing no definition), I think most bankruptcy lawyers feel how the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously felt about obscenity--we know one when we see it. Determining that a patent license was executory in the first place was an issue in the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in RPD Holdings, L.L.C. v.

Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code imposes restrictions on the employment of professionals to assist a trustee, requiring that such professionals “not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate” and be “disinterested persons.” Section 363(b) permits the trustee, after notice and a hearing, to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate,” and does not impose restrictions on employment comparable to those of section 327(a).