Highly anticipated changes to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure became effective on December 1, 2011. Rule 2019 mandates certain disclosures concerning the economic interests of creditors and interest holders in bankruptcy cases. Whether these disclosure requirements apply to ad hoc, or informal, creditor groups has been the subject of vigorous dispute in the bankruptcy courts during the last four years, with courts lining up on both sides of the divide in roughly equal numbers.

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.

In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review (Vol. 9, No. 4), we reported on significant changes to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Rule 2019") recommended by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules (the "Rules Committee").

One of the key protections afforded to secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the right of a holder of a secured claim to credit bid the allowed amount of its claim as part of a sale process under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:

Principles of corporate governance that determine how a company functions outside of bankruptcy are transformed and in some cases abrogated once the company files for chapter 11 protection, when the debtor's board and management act as a "debtor-in-possession" ("DIP") that bears fiduciary obligations to the chapter 11 estate and all stakeholders involved in the bankruptcy case.

Ohio-based, 102-year-old automobile parts manufacturer Dana Corporation and 40 of its subsidiaries filed for chapter 11 protection in the U.S. in March 2006. Dana’s operations, however, extend well beyond the borders of the U.S. — the company has 46,000 employees in 28 countries. Integrating a complex restructuring of Dana’s U.S. operations in chapter 11 with Dana’s extensive operations and obligations abroad has posed some unique challenges to Jones Day’s restructuring professionals.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

Unlike in cases filed under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a petition for recognition of a foreign bankruptcy or insolvency case under chapter 15 does not automatically trigger a stay of actions against a debtor or its U.S. assets. Instead, the automatic stay generally applies only at such time that the U.S.

Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code caps the amount of a lessor’s claim against a debtor-lessee for damages arising from the termination of a real property lease. The statutory cap is calculated according to a formula that considers, among other things, the date on which the lessor “repossessed” or the debtor-lessee “surrendered” the leased property. Because those terms are not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however, courts disagree as to whether state or federal law should determine their meanings for the purpose of calculating the allowed amount of the lessor’s claims.

In 1984, the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to examine the Bankruptcy Code’s new definition of “claim” in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Focusing on the “right to payment” language in that definition, the court decided that a claim arises when a claimant’s right to payment accrues under applicable nonbankruptcy law. This “accrual” test was widely criticized by other circuit courts as contradicting the broad definition of “claim” envisioned by Congress and the Bankruptcy Code.