The equitable theory of veil piercing, intended to serve as a rectifying mechanism against certain fraud, dishonesty or wrongdoing, is of particular import in the bankruptcy context given that it is an attractive remedy for a creditor of an insolvent company hoping to obtain a greater recovery on its claim. State law governs veil piercing claims and sets forth the hurdles a party must overcome in order to persuade the bankruptcy court that the debtor’s corporate formalities should be ignored.

As one bankruptcy court has said, “[b]ecause deals are the heart and soul of the [c]hapter 11 process, bankruptcy courts enforce them as cut by the parties.” Unfortunately, however, deals do not always turn out as the parties expected and there is sometimes litigation to determine what exactly was bargained for in a chapter 11 plan.

Despite recent criticisms of venue selection and cries to limit or curtail various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York demonstrates that the bankruptcy courts may continue to broadly interpret the scope of their jurisdictional reach and the powers and authorities granted to them under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re JPA No. 111 Co., Ltd., No. 21-12075 (DSJ) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.

In Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 503 B.R. 348
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York held that the “safe harbor” under section
546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code for settlement payments made
in connection with securities contracts does not preclude
claims brought by a chapter 11 plan litigation trustee on behalf
of creditors under state law to avoid as fraudulent transfers
pre-bankruptcy payments to shareholders in a leveraged buyout

InGrayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether certain securities transferred and payments made during the course of a Ponzi scheme could be avoided as fraudulent transfers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court upheld a judgment denying avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transfers of securities because the debtor did not have an “interest” in the securities at the time of the transfers.

In a much-awaited judgment, the UK Supreme Court has decided that the liability of a company in administration or liquidation to contribute to an under-funded pension fund following a Financial Support Direction or a Contribution Notice is a provable debt ranking equally with other unsecured creditors. Crucially, it is not an expense of the administration or liquidation which would cause it to rank ahead of all creditors (except fixed charge holders) and even the administrator's or liquidator's own remuneration.

Amid the economic hardships brought upon us by the Great Recession, the plight of cities, towns, and other municipalities across the U.S. has received a significant amount of media exposure. The media has been particularly interested in the spate of recent chapter 9 bankruptcy filings by Vallejo, Stockton, San Bernardino, and Mammoth Lakes, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Central Falls, Rhode Island. A variety of factors have combined to create a virtual maelstrom of woes for U.S.

On May 14, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first ruling of this Term concerning a bankruptcy issue. In Hall v. U.S., S. Ct.

On October 4, 2011, Judge James M. Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011), that a “triangular setoff” does not satisfy the Bankruptcy Code’s mutuality requirement and that the Bankruptcy Code’s safe-harbor provisions do not eliminate that requirement in connection with setoffs under financial contracts.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).