Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates categories of claims that are entitled to elevated priority as “administrative expenses.” Under section 503(b)(3)(D), administrative expenses include “actual, necessary expenses” incurred by a creditor, indenture trustee, equity holder, or unofficial committee “in making a substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case.

The failed bid of liquidators for two hedge funds affiliated with defunct investment firm Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., to obtain recognition of the funds’ Cayman Islands winding-up proceedings under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was featured prominently in business headlines during the late summer and fall of 2007.

Entities doing business with a customer that files for bankruptcy protection generally have the right to refuse to continue providing goods or services to the chapter 11 debtor, unless such goods or services are covered by a continuing contract, in which case any forfeiture of the debtor’s rights under the agreement is generally prohibited to afford the debtor a reasonable opportunity to decide what to do with the contract.

“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.

On January 31, 2008, less than two years after the institution of their bankruptcy cases, Dana Corporation and its affiliated debtor companies became one of the first large manufacturing entities with fully funded exit financing to emerge from chapter 11 under the recently revised Bankruptcy Code.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

Two circuit courts of appeal recently addressed whether a company filing chapter 11 for the sole purpose of retaining vital leases did so in good faith. In In re Capitol Food of Fields Corner, the First Circuit, in a matter of first impression on the issue of chapter 11’s implied good-faith filing requirement, declined to address the broader question, concluding that even if there is a good-faith filing requirement, a prima facie showing of bad faith could not be met because the debtor articulated several legitimate reasons for the necessity of reorganizing under chapter 11.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.