The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

Two circuit courts of appeal recently addressed whether a company filing chapter 11 for the sole purpose of retaining vital leases did so in good faith. In In re Capitol Food of Fields Corner, the First Circuit, in a matter of first impression on the issue of chapter 11’s implied good-faith filing requirement, declined to address the broader question, concluding that even if there is a good-faith filing requirement, a prima facie showing of bad faith could not be met because the debtor articulated several legitimate reasons for the necessity of reorganizing under chapter 11.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.

Although it has been described as an “extraordinary remedy,” the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of related debtor-entities in bankruptcy (if circumstances so dictate) is relatively uncontroversial, as an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court’s broad (albeit nonstatutory) equitable powers. By contrast, considerable controversy surrounds the far less common practice of ordering consolidation of a debtor in bankruptcy with a nondebtor.

In the chapter 1 1 cases of Adelphia Communications Corporation and its subsidiaries, Adelphia sought to assume and assign more than 2,000 franchise agreements in connection with the proposed transfer of its cable operations to affiliates of Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable. Numerous local franchising authorities objected, arguing, among other things, that they had a right of first refusal under the agreements, and in some cases also under a local ordinance, to purchase the franchise on substantially the same terms and conditions.

Amid the economic hardships brought upon us by the Great Recession, the plight of cities, towns, and other municipalities across the U.S. has received a significant amount of media exposure. The media has been particularly interested in the spate of recent chapter 9 bankruptcy filings by Vallejo, Stockton, San Bernardino, and Mammoth Lakes, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Central Falls, Rhode Island. A variety of factors have combined to create a virtual maelstrom of woes for U.S.

Rehabilitating a debtor’s business and maximizing the value of its estate for the benefit of its various stakeholders through the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan is the ultimate goal in most chapter 11 cases. Achievement of that goal, however, typically requires resolution of disagreements among various parties in interest regarding the composition of the chapter 11 plan and the form and manner of the distributions to be provided thereunder.

The power to alter the relative priority of claims due to the misconduct of one creditor that causes injury to others is an important tool in the array of remedies available to a bankruptcy court in exercising its broad equitable powers. However, unlike provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP ”) to seek the imposition of equitable remedies, such as lien or transfer avoidance, the statutory authority for equitable subordination—section 510(c)—does not specify exactly who may seek subordination of a claim.

As the seventh anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code draws near, the volume of chapter 15 cases commenced in U.S. bankruptcy courts on behalf of foreign debtors has increased rapidly. During that period, there has also (understandably) been a marked uptick in litigation concerning various aspects of the comparatively new legislative regime governing cross-border bankruptcy cases patterned on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. One such issue was the subject of a ruling recently handed down by a Texas district court. In In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 470 B.R.