April 17, 2009, will mark the three-and-one-half-year anniversary of the effective date of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted as part of the comprehensive bankruptcy reforms implemented under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
In light of the continued favorable business climate and ample liquidity in the U.S., the falloff in business bankruptcy filings in 2006 should come as no big surprise. Unlike 2005, which added three new stars to the all-time hit parade of chapter 11 “mega” cases, 2006 saw no new additions to the Top 10 list for public-company chapter 11 filings. Overall, the number of business bankruptcy filings dropped 20 percent in fiscal year 2006, the fifth straight year a decline was reported, according to statistics released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in October of 2006.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 2013 BL 341634 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor "under this title" to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.
A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.
InGrayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether certain securities transferred and payments made during the course of a Ponzi scheme could be avoided as fraudulent transfers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court upheld a judgment denying avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transfers of securities because the debtor did not have an “interest” in the securities at the time of the transfers.
Section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates categories of claims that are entitled to elevated priority as “administrative expenses.” Under section 503(b)(3)(D), administrative expenses include “actual, necessary expenses” incurred by a creditor, indenture trustee, equity holder, or unofficial committee “in making a substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case.
The failed bid of liquidators for two hedge funds affiliated with defunct investment firm Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., to obtain recognition of the funds’ Cayman Islands winding-up proceedings under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was featured prominently in business headlines during the late summer and fall of 2007.
Entities doing business with a customer that files for bankruptcy protection generally have the right to refuse to continue providing goods or services to the chapter 11 debtor, unless such goods or services are covered by a continuing contract, in which case any forfeiture of the debtor’s rights under the agreement is generally prohibited to afford the debtor a reasonable opportunity to decide what to do with the contract.