Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

January 8, 2008 A Delaware bankruptcy court decided on Friday that mortgage servicing rights could be severed from a mortgage loan repurchase agreement that fell within applicable safe harbors of the Bankruptcy Code, at least where the loans were transferred “servicing retained.” The decision isCalyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp., et al. (In re American Home Mortgage Corp.), Bankr. Case No. 07-51704 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 4, 2008).

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.

On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

Client Alert

The Bankruptcy Code gives a bankruptcy trustee, or the debtor in possession, the power to “avoid” certain transfers made by the debtor at various times before filing for bankruptcy relief.

The reforms introducing a safe harbour for directors of insolvent companies and, from 1 July 2018, a limited stay on the operation of ipso facto clauses have been passed by both Houses of the Australian Parliament and will likely be enacted by month end. Late on Monday evening, after some debate, the Senate passed the reforms with only minor amendments. The Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill 2017 then returned to the House of Representatives who formally passed the amended Bill last night.

Safe harbour