Introduction

In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that, at first blush, appeared to severely curtail the scope of the transferee protections provided by Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers, including transfers “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a “financial institution” in connection with a “securities contract.” A recent decision from the Second Circuit breathes fresh life into the defense.

The Bottom Line:

This alert describes issues to consider when a derivatives dealer counterparty becomes insolvent.We address below issues involving termination of a master agreement, close-out netting of underlying trades and collateral. Even though this alert focuses on the bankruptcy of a dealer, many of the issues would also arise in connection with the bankruptcy of most non-dealer counterparties.

1. Existence of an Event of Default and Termination

a. Existence of an Event of Default

Court holds that distributions made pursuant to priority payment provisions contained in CDO transactions are protected by Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code

On May 23, 2008, in American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Inc.(In re American Home Mortgage Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that BBB-rated mortgagebacked notes are eligible for the Bankruptcy Code’s repurchase agreement safe harbor as “interests in mortgage loans”.

In a May 23, 2008 decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that BBB-rated mortgage-backed notes are eligible for the Bankruptcy Code's repurchase agreement safe harbor as “interests in mortgage loans”. The court also held that a repurchase agreement constituted a sale, as opposed to a financing governed by UCC Article 9 -- the first decision on this topic since the financial contract safe harbors were expanded under the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

January 8, 2008 A Delaware bankruptcy court decided on Friday that mortgage servicing rights could be severed from a mortgage loan repurchase agreement that fell within applicable safe harbors of the Bankruptcy Code, at least where the loans were transferred “servicing retained.” The decision isCalyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp., et al. (In re American Home Mortgage Corp.), Bankr. Case No. 07-51704 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 4, 2008).

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).