The Supreme Court recently addressed two bankruptcy issues. In its opinion, the Court resolved a circuit split regarding the breadth of the safe harbor provision which protects certain transfers by financial institutions in connection with a securities contract. In Village at Lakeridge, the Court weighed in on the scope of appellate review and whether a bankruptcy court’s factual determination should be reviewed for clear error or de novo. These decisions are notable because they provide guidance on previously murky issues of bankruptcy law.

In a client advisory sent by our office a few months ago, we described a decision in the Madoff saga in which the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court) closed off a potential avenue of significant recovery for the Madoff Trustee (the Trustee) and the Ponzi scheme victims by denying the Trustee standing to pursue certain claims against feeder funds – firms that sent investors’ funds to Madof

Possible application of Section 101(22)(A) to safe harbor’s covered entity requirement raises important questions for future transferee defendants.

Key Points:

• Merit Management raises the possibility that customers of “financial institutions” may qualify for protection under Section 546(e) safe harbor even if they would not otherwise meet Section 546(e)’s covered entity requirement.

• Treating customers of “financial institutions” as covered entities could broaden the scope of safe harbor.

Background

In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,¹ the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.

Introduction

A recent decision from a trial court sitting in Illinois calls into question whether debt collectors can rely on a widely used disclosure when collecting debt that may be subject to an expired limitations period.

A copy of the opinion in Richardson v. LVNV Funding, LLC is available at:  Link to Opinion.

(7th Cir. July 28, 2016)

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

Setoff is a doctrine based as much on practical considerations as on equitable ones.