In September 2017, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Act 2017 (Cth) to amend and reform the insolvency and external administration provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
One of the main changes implemented by these reforms was the introduction of a ‘safe harbour’ protection for company directors.
On June 28th, the Second Circuit held that payments made by Enron to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity were not avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the Court answers in the affirmative an issue of first impression among the appellate courts: whether the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 546(e), which shields settlement payments from avoidance in bankruptcy, extends to an issuer's payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity.
The bankruptcy court overseeing the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases rejected efforts by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) to recover roughly $1 billion in payments made to numerous noteholder defendants from the liquidation of collateral originally pledged to secure both obligations under notes issued by special purpose entities and credit default swap (CDS) obligations to LBSF, holding that the termination of the swap and liquidation and distribution of the collateral were protected by the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
On May 5, the judge overseeing the bankruptcy case of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc issued an opinion refusing Swedbank AB's request to keep several million dollars in post-bankruptcy Lehman deposits as a setoff against pre-bankruptcy swap termination claims.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. eliminated any circuit split or confusion over the language of the section 546(e) safe harbor.
On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. The key issue in the case was the scope of Section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code which insulates certain transactions from a bankruptcy trustee’s statutory avoidance powers. A bankruptcy trustee may avoid many types of pre-petition transfers, including preferential payments made to creditors within 90 days of a bankruptcy petition and transfers made for less than reasonably equivalent value completed within two years of a bankruptcy filing.
Delaware District Judge Leonard P. Stark has seemingly split with the Second Circuit and held that the safe harbor in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not bar fraudulent transfer claims brought on behalf of creditors under state law, ratifying a June 2016 opinion from Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross.
On April 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a landmark 2019 decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments to prevent the avoidance in bankruptcy of $8.3 billion in payments made to the shareholders of Tribune Co. as part of its 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO").
On July 26, 2016, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) "safe harbor" applicable to constructive fraudulent transfers that are settlement payments made in connection with securities contracts does not protect "transfers that are simply conducted through financial institutions (or the other entities named in section 546(e)), where the entity is neither the debtor nor the transferee but only the conduit."FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 2016 BL 243677.