Recent Developments
Section 552(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that if a creditor prior to bankruptcy obtained a security interest in rents paid to the debtor, that security interest extends to postpetition rents to the extent provided in the security agreement. Courts have disagreed, however, on the question of whether the debtor must provide adequate protection with respect to such postpetition rents. The resolution of this issue typically determines whether the debtor may use a portion of the postpetition rents that it receives to fund the administrative costs of its bankruptcy.
Europe has struggled mightily during the last several years to triage a long series of critical blows to the economies of the 27 countries that comprise the European Union, as well as the
collective viability of eurozone economies. Here we provide a snapshot of some recent developments relating to insolvency and restructuring in the EU.
The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear” of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of “any interest in such property,” has generated a fair amount of controversy.
In keeping with the courts’ narrow construction of what constitutes “substantial contribution” in a chapter 11 case, an Ohio bankruptcy court in In re AmFin Financial Corp., 2012 WL 652018 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012), denied administrative- expense priority to the fees and expenses of the holders of approximately $100 million in senior notes (the “Senior Noteholders”) issued by debtor AmFin Financial Corporation (“AFC”).
U.S. federal courts have frequently been referred to as the “guardians of the Constitution.”
During the last few years, Italian bankruptcy law has been shifting from a traditional "procedural/judicial" model, based on the central role of courts called upon to safeguard the "public interest" involved in bankruptcy by actively directing the procedure and making the most important decisions, to a model that recognizes the private interests of creditors. Under the new paradigm, creditors are conferred with decisional powers, while courts maintain a principally supervisory role.
In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
A creditor’s ability in a bankruptcy case to exercise rights that it has under applicable law to set off an obligation it owes to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to it, thereby converting its unsecured claim to a secured claim to the extent of the setoff, is an important entitlement.
The importance and practical benefits resulting from the use of the same in-house counsel for an entire corporate family are numerous. For example, the in-house attorneys are particularly familiar with the corporate family’s structure, can assist with joint public filings, and can expertly oversee the corporate family’s compliance with regulatory regimes. If a subsidiary in the corporate family becomes financially distressed, however, the creditors of the financially distressed entity may look to the parent corporation for recourse.