Much attention in the commercial bankruptcy world has been devoted recently to judicial pronouncements concerning whether the practice of senior creditor class “gifting” to junior classes under a chapter 1 1 plan violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “absolute priority rule.” Comparatively little scrutiny, by contrast, has been directed toward significant developments in ongoing controversies in the courts regarding the absolute priority rule outside the realm of senior class gifting— namely, in connection with the “new value” exception to the rule and whether the rule was written out of the Bankr

A decision recently handed down by the Delaware Chancery Court, CML V, LLC v. Bax, indicates that creditors of a limited liability company (“LLC”) organized under Delaware law do not have standing to institute derivative suits against an LLC’s management, even when the LLC is insolvent, unless the right is expressly set forth in the LLC’s organizational documents or external agreements.

Background

As attention shifts from the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 to the global sovereign crisis that currently is affecting much of Europe, lawmakers are scrambling to create new laws and regulations designed to stave off the next financial crisis.[1] Meanwhile, a different threat quietly has been growing in America's states, cities, towns, municipalities, and other political subdivisions.

One of the key protections afforded to secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the right of a holder of a secured claim to credit bid the allowed amount of its claim as part of a sale process under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:

If an international airline that is a member of the International Air Transport Association (“IATA”) goes into insolvent external administration under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the “Act”), will the IATA Clearing House Regulations (effective January 1, 2006) (the “CH Regulations”) continue to govern the relationship between IATA, the insolvent airline, and the other members of IATA? A recent judgment of Australia’s High Court clarifies these issues.

2002 was a seminal year for restructuring and insolvency professionals in the U.K. In November of that year, the eagerly anticipated Enterprise Act of 2002, which was intended to lay the statutory foundations for the “rescue culture,” received royal assent. Six months earlier, with considerably less fanfare, the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EC No. 1346/2000) (the “Regulation”) was introduced throughout the EU (except Denmark). A clear understanding of how these twin pieces of law operate is crucial when reviewing a stakeholder’s options once a company becomes distressed.

The implementation of restrictions on stock and/or claims trading has become almost routine in large chapter 11 cases involving public companies on the basis that such restrictions are vital to prevent forfeiture of favorable tax attributes that can be triggered by a change in control. Continued reliance on stock trading injunctions as a means of preserving net operating loss carry forwards, however, may be problematic, after the controversial ruling handed down in 2005 by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re UAL Corp.

In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., 2014 BL 13998 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014), leave to app. denied, 2014 BL 33749 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014), certification denied, 2014 BL 37766 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2014), a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor's ability to credit bid its debt in connection with the sale of a hybrid car manufacturer's assets.

Commercial landlords hailed as a significant victory the enactment in 2005 of a 210-day “drop dead” period after which a lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee is deemed rejected unless, prior to the expiration of the period, a chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee assumes or rejects the lease.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit―in Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2013)―has joined the Second Circuit and departed from the Fifth Circuit by holding that an allegedly fraudulently transferred asset is not property of the estate until recovered pursuant to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore is not covered by the automatic stay. According to the court, its decision “gives Congress’s chosen language its ordinary meaning, and abides by a rule against surplusage.”