July 2018
2018 Summer review M&A legal and market developments
In this issue...
Contractual provisions.............................................................1 Company law...........................................................................4
Listed companies....................................................................7 Good faith................................................................................9
Authors: Philip Broke, Veronica Carson
A crisis far beyond anything experienced in recent memory
The way in which regulators, investors, banks and governments respond to the current sovereign debt challenges will echo for many years. Decisions made today will, for better or worse, continue to have consequences far beyond our current time horizon. Getting it right will not be easy.
This issue reviews the most important recent changes to the regime of challenging transactions made by debtors in anticipation of insolvency. These changes were introduced in the Resolution adopted at the Plenary Session of the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation (the “Supreme Commercial Court”) No. 63 “Certain Matters Relating to the Application of Chapter III.1 of the Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)”1 dated 23 December 2010 (the “Resolution”).2
In the wake of recent bankruptcy filings by several prominent financial institutions, there’s a growing interest in changing standard credit documentation to address the risks of defaulting lenders and nonperforming administrative agents. Here are credit agreement provisions that financial institutions, acting as swingline lenders and letter of credit issuers, can require to protect themselves against the risk of a defaulting lender.
Fraudulent transfer law allows creditors and bankruptcy trustees, under certain circumstances, to sue transferees to recover funds received where a debtor’s transfers to the transferees actually or constructively defrauded its creditors. Under both the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act adopted by most states and the fraudulent transfer action created by federal bankruptcy law, a transferee of an alleged fraudulent transfer may assert a defense from such liability by establishing that it received the transfer in good faith and for reasonably equivalent value. See 11 U.S.C.
Last month, in a significant ruling in the General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) bankruptcy case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions to dismiss, as bad faith filings, the bankruptcy cases of 20 purported bankruptcyremote special purpose entity (“SPE”) subsidiary debtors.1
Part One of this article, published in the last edition of the Restructuring Review, examined recent developments in the gaming industry, focusing on strategies employed by gaming companies to increase liquidity and avoid insolvency. Part Two focuses on how potential buyers can use the bankruptcy process to purchase gaming facilities, free and clear of prior liens, and describes certain complications inherent in the acquisition of this type of asset.
Acquiring Gaming Facilities through Chapter 11
Sale Process
On August 11, 2009, in one of the most significant rulings to date in the GGP bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court denied motions to dismiss as bad faith filings the bankruptcy cases of 20 GGP property-level subsidiaries. In denying the motions, the court stated that the fundamental creditor protections negotiated in the special purpose entity structures at the property level are in place and will remain in place during the pendency of the chapter 11 cases.
In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).
As the Madoff Securities and Stanford Financial schemes have unraveled in recent months, financial industry participants have had to scrutinize closely their involvement with these entities. A key issue in each of these cases will be the extent to which the trustee (or similar representative) can “claw back” payments made as part of the Ponzi and related fraudulent schemes. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered similar facts in Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P.