The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.

A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

The early 2000s witnessed a wave of chapter 11 filings by entities with liability for asbestos personal-injury claims. The large number of filings was matched by the variety of legal strategies that companies pursued to address their asbestos liabilities in chapter 11. The chapter 11 case of Quigley Company, Inc. ("Quigley"), was one of the last large asbestos cases to file in the 2000s and represents one of the more interesting strategies for dealing with asbestos liabilities in chapter 11.

Editor’s Note: This is a new one for us at The Bankruptcy Cave. We are starting a series of primers, covering a narrow range of law but with more depth than just “here’s a recent case.” And also, we have our first edition of “The Bankruptcy Cave Embedded Briefs” – top quality briefs on a certain issue, feel free to download to your own form files or come back and grab ’em when you need ’em. Let us know what you think – we are always trying to improve things around here for our readers.

In some good news for commercial vendors, the Supreme Court of Texas recently ruled that payments for ordinary services provided to an insolvent customer are not recoverable as fraudulent transfers, even if the customer turns out to be a “Ponzi scheme” instead of a legitimate business.

Buyers of, and lenders upon, distressed California real property can sleep a little better following a recent U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision: In the Matter of Craig L. Tippett, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18914 (September 4, 2008). In Tippett, the Court upheld the California bona fide purchaser statute against a federal preemption claim and declined to find a violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision in order to affirm an unauthorized real property sale by the Chapter 7 debtor.

Directors and officers of Delaware corporations face no liability to corporate creditors from direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent ruling in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, (May 18, 2007) (“North American Catholic”).

One of the many issues which arose from the collapse of Lehman Brothers was whether “flip provisions”, which reverse a swap counterparty’s priority in the order of payment on insolvency, were invalid on the basis that they contravened the anti-deprivation principle.  This is a long-established common law principle which seeks to prevent an insolvent party from arranging its affairs to frustrate the legitimate claims of creditors.

In a client advisory sent by our office a few months ago, we described a decision in the Madoff saga in which the District Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court) closed off a potential avenue of significant recovery for the Madoff Trustee (the Trustee) and the Ponzi scheme victims by denying the Trustee standing to pursue certain claims against feeder funds – firms that sent investors’ funds to Madof