Introduction
On September 17, 2009 Judge Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued two orders that may significantly impact parties who held, or still currently hold, derivative contracts with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) or any of the other debtors in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases (the Debtors).
On May 31, 2009, approximately 30 days after Chrysler Group LLC and affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy relief, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York authorized the sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” – an entity formed by Chrysler and Fiat Automobiles SpA and initially majority-owned by Chrysler’s Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA) – free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances under section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Fiat Transaction).
In the recent case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA & others [2016] EWHC 1686, the High Court has held for the first time that a dividend can be challenged as a transaction entered into at an undervalue within the meaning of section 423(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA”).
The Facts
The facts of the case are long and complex but for present purposes the pertinent facts are as follows.
Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited (now Windward Prospects Limited) (“AWA”) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sequana SA (“SSA”).
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
The early 2000s witnessed a wave of chapter 11 filings by entities with liability for asbestos personal-injury claims. The large number of filings was matched by the variety of legal strategies that companies pursued to address their asbestos liabilities in chapter 11. The chapter 11 case of Quigley Company, Inc. ("Quigley"), was one of the last large asbestos cases to file in the 2000s and represents one of the more interesting strategies for dealing with asbestos liabilities in chapter 11.
On April 30, 2009, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation (the "SAT") jointly issued the Notice on Certain Issues of Corporate Income Tax Treatment of Enterprise Reorganizations (the "Notice"), Cai Shui (2009) No. 59. The Notice provides corporate income tax treatment of various types of reorganizations including debt restructurings, acquisitions of equity, acquisitions of assets, mergers, and de-mergers.
The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.
For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.