German insolvency law, unlike US insolvency law, only recently introduced (in 2012) the so-called protective shield proceedings (Schutzschirmverfahren) to enable potentially illiquid and/or over-indebted debtors to restructure the company on the basis of a so-called insolvency plan. Thereby, the liquidation of a company by a future insolvency administrator can be avoided.

This article looks at ways to restructure debt taken up by a German company. First it discusses financings governed by English law and then moves on to look at options where German law-governs the debt.

Financings governed by English law (restructuring through schemes of arrangement)

In recent years a number of German companies such as Tele Columbus, Rodenstock and Primacom have used English law scheme of arrangements to restructure their debt.

An element of the restructuring toolbox

Facts

A previous post introduced the general concept of ROT provisions as a means to protect suppliers as creditors in the insolvency of their customers. The basic principle of ROT under German law is that the supplier remains the owner of the goods which it has supplied to its customer until the customer has fully paid the purchase price for the goods.

Key point

In a financial restructuring, creditors have to pay attention that the restructuring undertakings of the insolvent company are likely to be achieved.

Background

Under German insolvency law, the insolvency administrator may challenge a transaction if an insolvent company intended to disadvantage its creditors (and the other party knew that intention). The German Supreme Court presumes such intention if a company knew about its impending illiquidity.

Facts

This is the second part of a two-part article on ways to restructure debt taken up by a German company. The first part looked at financings governed by English law, this second part deals with German law-governed debt.

Part II – Financings governed by German law (restructuring through protective shield proceedings or schemes of arrangement)

INTRODUCTION

Die Frage der Kompetenzverteilung zwischen dem Vorstand und der Hauptversammlung der AG ist ein Dauerthema des Aktienrechts. Der Autor entwickelt ein eigenes Konzept zur dogmatischen Begründung ungeschriebener Hauptversammlungskompetenzen und untersucht, ob für den Börsenrückzug und die fakultative Insolvenzantragstellung eine Zustimmung der Hauptversammlung erforderlich ist. Der Autor lehnt die Frosta-Entscheidung des BGH ab und vertritt die Ansicht, dass der Börsenrückzug (reguläres Delisting wie auch das Downlisting) wertungsmäßig mit den in § 119 Abs. 1 Nr.

Ausgangssituation

I)     Introduction