In a judgment dated 26 / 03 / 2015, ref. no. IX ZR 302 / 13, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) held that a provisional insolvency administrator is personally liable for monies paid into the escrow account in the event of claims of unjust enrichment being made due to the payments having no proper basis in law.
The ruling related to the following situation:
Mit Urteil vom 26. März 2015, AZ IX ZR 302 / 13, entschied der BGH, dass ein vorläufiger Insolvenzver- walter für Zahlungen auf das Voll- rechtstreuhandkonto persönlich haf- tet, wenn Bereicherungsansprüche wegen rechtsgrundloser Zahlungen geltend gemacht werden.
Dieser Entscheidung lag folgender Sachverhalt zu Grunde:
Stillhalten oder Einfordern?
In a previous update on the German law perspective regarding bunker supplies, some significant problems associated with bunker supplies under German law were highlighted (for further details please see "Bunker supplies – maritime lien and risk of vessel arrest").
Key point
The restructuring of the AVK Group shows what chances the “Law for Further Facilitating the Restructuring of Companies” provides regarding the restructuring of group entities in the group structure and incorporating them back into the group.
Background
Report contents:
German Federal Court of Justice decision paves the way for bond restructurings under 2009 Bonds Act.
This post addresses the question of how retention of title (“ROT”) provisions are effectively agreed to as part of the contractual relationship between a supplier and its German customer under German law.
German insolvency case law on intellectual property rights has experienced rapid development in recent years, while attempts by the German legislature to regulate this subject with precision have repeatedly failed. The multitude of stakeholders involved (among them insolvency administrators, licensors, sub-licensees and creditors that have liens on IP rights) could not agree on a resolution acceptable to all.
In a situation where the survival of a German company depends on restructuring measures by third parties (mainly lenders) who fear that the shareholders may use their hold-out position in a potential subsequent exit by sale of the shares, it is an option for the lenders to demand from the shareholders that the shares are transferred to a trustee to be held in a “double-sided trust” (doppelnützige Treuhand).