(BVerfG, Beschluss vom 12.01.2016, Az. 1 BvR 3102/13)

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat sich per Beschluss vom 12. Januar 2016 zu der Frage geäußert, ob der Ausschluss juristischer Personen von der Bestellung als Insolvenzverwalter verfassungsgemäß ist oder nicht. Anlass war die Verfassungsbeschwer- de einer auf Insolvenzverwaltung spezialisierten Gesellschaft von Rechtsanwälten, welche zuvor die Aufnahme auf die Vorauswahlliste für Insolvenzverwalter eines Amtsgerichts vergeblich vor den Zivilgerichten zu erstreiten versucht hatte.

(Federal Constitutional Court, judgment dated 12 January 2016, case ref. 1 BvR 3102/13)

Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has now ruled on whether the exclusion of legal entities from being appointed as insolvency administrator is constitutional or  not in its judgment dated 12 January 2016. The ruling was triggered by a constitutional complaint from a firm of lawyers specialising in insolvency administration, which had previously argued in vain before the civil courts for inclusion by a local court on its pre-selected list of insolvency administrators.

The economically significant investment activity by insurance companies is subject to the regulatory requirements of the German Insurance Supervision Act (Versiche­ rungsaufsichtsgesetz – VAG). With regard to the provisions of the European Solvency II Directive, changes to the requirements for capital investments of insurance companies have resulted from the new VAG which came into effect as of 01 January 2016 (VAG new). This gives us cause to take a look at the most important changes.

A.  Former legal situation

Die Insolvenzanfechtung ist in den letzten Jahren zu einem großen Risiko für Gläubiger geworden. Das gilt in besonderer Weise, wenn man Kenntnis von wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten seines Geschäftspartners hat. In einer aktuellen Entscheidung hat der Bundesgerichtshof die Maßstäbe der Anfechtbarkeit bei außergerichtlichen Sanierungskonzepten umfassend beschrieben – und im Ergebnis die Anfechtungsgefahr verschärft. Da auch die für Herbst 2016 ins Auge gefasste Reform des Anfechtungsrechtes in diesem Bereich keine Änderung bringen wird, ist eine Befassung mit der Entscheidung notwendig.

Einleitung

Introduction

The liability regime under Section 64 sentence 1 GmbHG and Sections 92 para. 2, 93 para. 3 Nr. 6 AktG for payments made after the company’s insolvency imposes severe personal liability risk on the management of limited liability companies and stock corporations. This does not only apply to the management of German limited liability companies (“GmbH”) and stock corporations (“AG”) but also to companies incorporated under foreign law that have their centre of main interest in Germany, as the European Court of Justice has decided just recently.

Legal background

Under German criminal law, it is illegal for the management not to fulfil tax obligations when due, whereas under German insolvency law a company must treat all creditors equally when the company is illiquid. By paying taxes after the company becomes illiquid, the management would violate this obligation and prefer the state.

The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) recently held that creditors cannot bring claims against the Hellenic Republic before the German courts in the context of Greece's debt restructuring in 2012 , finding that Greece enjoys immunity from jurisdiction before the German courts (decision of 8 March 2016; docket number VI ZR 516/14).

Background and facts

Key points

The ‘qualified subordination’ tool is a useful device for a German company that may be balance-sheet insolvent.

Background

German insolvency law requires the directors of a company to file for insolvency when the company is over-indebted pursuant to sec. 19 German Insolvency Code (‘InsO’). The failure to comply with this obligation is a criminal offence, and can also trigger directors’ liabilities under German corporate law.

‘Qualified Subordination’