In UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli),1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor is entitled to collect a prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. The Court found that the secured creditor could collect the penalty, whether or not it is reasonable, so long as the penalty is enforceable under state law. The Court reasoned that any other holding would leave open the possibility that an unsecured creditor could recover more from a solvent estate than a secured creditor.

Background

The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.

In an important recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, testing the outer reaches of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, In re Johns Manville Corp., 06-2099 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008), the court considered whether claims that are not derivative of a debtor’s liability, but rather seek to recover directly from an insurer for its own alleged misconduct, can be enjoined by the “channeling” mechanism developed by the bankruptcy court.

A recent decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York underscores the risk to junior creditors of not understanding fully the scope of consent given to a senior creditor to modify its senior lending arrangements with a debtor under the terms of an intercreditor agreement. In Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. v.

Must a foreign debtor's insolvency representative obtain permission from a United States bankruptcy court before exercising the debtor's rights as shareholder to remove and replace directors and officers of a US corporation? The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit recently held not, provided that the representative does not require judicial assistance to exercise these rights.1

By Order, dated January 14, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, granted the motion (the "Motion") filed by a group of creditors seeking transfer of venue of the Dunmore Homes, Inc. (the "Debtor") bankruptcy case from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") to the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. A number of other creditors and the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee joined in the Motion.

The importance and practical benefits resulting from the use of the same in-house counsel for an entire corporate family are numerous. For example, the in-house attorneys are particularly familiar with the corporate family’s structure, can assist with joint public filings, and can expertly oversee the corporate family’s compliance with regulatory regimes. If a subsidiary in the corporate family becomes financially distressed, however, the creditors of the financially distressed entity may look to the parent corporation for recourse.

Recent news reports have focused on the problems of the financial markets on the one hand and consumer mortgage problems on the other. While Congress may yet grant authority to bankruptcy judges to modify home loans, modification of business loan facilities of all sizes remains available as a powerful and fundamental tool to be used in a business financial restructuring.

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.