Determining a question of first impression within its circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that an oversecured creditor is entitled to collect a bargained-for pre-payment penalty from a solvent debtor, regardless of the penalty’s “reasonableness” under section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In so holding, the First Circuit reversed the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy and District Courts for the District of Rhode Island. Gencarelli v. UPS Capital Business Credit, 50 F.3d 1 (1st Cir., Aug. 30, 2007).

The Adelphia Creditors Committee filed an adversary proceeding against approximately 380 defendants, including bank lenders, investment banks and their agents, alleging wrongdoing in the defendants’ dealings with Adelphia’s former management who looted the company. The complaint asserted numerous claims for relief in connection with borrowing facilities under which Adelphia became liable to repay the banks for billions of dollars that went to the insiders.

Following a recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy case approving cure notices and cure claims procedures, purchasers of unsecured trade claims originating out of executory contracts or unexpired leases should take special precautions to protect their rights or risk impairment or loss of such claims to the extent they become cure claims.

In Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the Supreme Court held that federal bankruptcy law does not automatically disallow claims for post-petition attorneys' fees incurred by a prepetition unsecured creditor simply because such fees are incurred in litigating issues arising under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court, however, left open the issue whether such claims may be disallowed on the basis that the attorneys' fees were incurred post-petition.

In the chapter 1 1 cases of Adelphia Communications Corporation and its subsidiaries, Adelphia sought to assume and assign more than 2,000 franchise agreements in connection with the proposed transfer of its cable operations to affiliates of Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable. Numerous local franchising authorities objected, arguing, among other things, that they had a right of first refusal under the agreements, and in some cases also under a local ordinance, to purchase the franchise on substantially the same terms and conditions.

Two circuit courts of appeal recently addressed whether a company filing chapter 11 for the sole purpose of retaining vital leases did so in good faith. In In re Capitol Food of Fields Corner, the First Circuit, in a matter of first impression on the issue of chapter 11’s implied good-faith filing requirement, declined to address the broader question, concluding that even if there is a good-faith filing requirement, a prima facie showing of bad faith could not be met because the debtor articulated several legitimate reasons for the necessity of reorganizing under chapter 11.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that a debtor may not reduce the number of votes required to confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization by purchasing certain claims. Such vote “gerrymandering” resulted in an unconfirmable plan, the court ruled. In re Machne Menachem, Inc., 233 Fed. Appex. 119, 2007 WL 1157015 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2007 (Pa.)).

While Bankruptcy Code section 105 grants broad powers to issue injunctions, most bankruptcy courts are reluctant to enjoin litigation in other venues. A recent ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit follows this trend, reversing a preliminary injunction issued by a bankruptcy court staying arbitration proceedings between two nondebtor parties.

However, the Ninth Circuit also articulated specific standards for when such a section 105 injunction may be obtained. In re Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 2007 WL 2555941 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2007).

For more than 10 years, the courts in New Jersey were split as to whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a chapter 13 debtor’s right to cure a default on a mortgage loan secured by the debtor’s primary residence expired at the foreclosure sale, or at the time the deed to the foreclosed property was delivered to the purchaser. That split now has been resolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in favor of the line of cases cutting off the right to cure at the time of the foreclosure sale. In re Connors, No. 06-3321 (3d Cir., Aug. 3, 2007).

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.