The Bankruptcy Code facilitates asset sales in chapter 11 by offering incentives to buyers and flexibility in structuring and timing the sale. A buyer can acquire assets free and clear of liens and is permitted to "cherry-pick" the debtor's contracts and leases to select only those it wants to keep. The assets and sale process can be structured in many ways, including auctions, private sales, lot or bulk sales, and going concern transactions.
The Key Parties
Lease Payments. It is not uncommon for a retailer with financial problems to be past due on lease payments. Filing for bankruptcy often gives a debtor “breathing room” to evaluate its financial condition, including profitability (or not) of non-residential real-property leases. Depending on the applicable law, this “breathing room” may also free up some cash flow for the debtor.
For more than 10 years, the courts in New Jersey were split as to whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a chapter 13 debtor’s right to cure a default on a mortgage loan secured by the debtor’s primary residence expired at the foreclosure sale, or at the time the deed to the foreclosed property was delivered to the purchaser. That split now has been resolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in favor of the line of cases cutting off the right to cure at the time of the foreclosure sale. In re Connors, No. 06-3321 (3d Cir., Aug. 3, 2007).
Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.
In UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli),1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor is entitled to collect a prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. The Court found that the secured creditor could collect the penalty, whether or not it is reasonable, so long as the penalty is enforceable under state law. The Court reasoned that any other holding would leave open the possibility that an unsecured creditor could recover more from a solvent estate than a secured creditor.
Background
The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.
In an important recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, testing the outer reaches of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, In re Johns Manville Corp., 06-2099 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008), the court considered whether claims that are not derivative of a debtor’s liability, but rather seek to recover directly from an insurer for its own alleged misconduct, can be enjoined by the “channeling” mechanism developed by the bankruptcy court.
A recent decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York underscores the risk to junior creditors of not understanding fully the scope of consent given to a senior creditor to modify its senior lending arrangements with a debtor under the terms of an intercreditor agreement. In Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. v.
Must a foreign debtor's insolvency representative obtain permission from a United States bankruptcy court before exercising the debtor's rights as shareholder to remove and replace directors and officers of a US corporation? The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit recently held not, provided that the representative does not require judicial assistance to exercise these rights.1