One of the significant changes brought about by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") was the treatment of loans secured by automobiles in Chapter 13 cases. Prior to BAPCPA, debtors were permitted to "cram down" the secured portions of automobile loans to the fair market value of the collateral. This often resulted in significant reductions to claims secured by automobiles.
A recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation, et al. ("Delphi") bankruptcy case calls into question the effectiveness of power of attorney provisions found in many claim purchase agreements. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, presiding over the Delphi bankruptcy proceeding, held that claims purchasers could not submit cure notices in reliance on powers of attorney.
Delphi Sent Cure Notices Only to Contract Counterparties
On March 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of State of Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. to consider the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that a bankruptcy court may exempt certain state and local taxes in a sale approved prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan under § 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Introduction
Section 1146(a) (formerly, and for the purposes of this case § 1146(c)) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The United States District Court for the Central District of California has reversed a bankruptcy court ruling allowing two law firms—Snyder Miller & Orton LLP (SMO) and Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP (MLB)—to serve as "special insurance counsel" to address insurance and insurance-coverage-litigation-related matters under the narrow special purpose standards of § 327(e). In re Thorpe Insulation Co., No. CV08-00246-DSF (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008). Citing In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675 (3d Cir.
In CDI Trust v. U.S. Electronics, Inc. (In re Communications Dynamics, Inc.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of whether a rejection damages claim is subject to setoff against a pre-petition debt owed by the creditor to the debtor. The Court found that a rejection damages claim should be treated as if it arose pre-petition, and that the provisions of section 553 permitted, rather than prevented, the setoff of the rejection damages claim against the pre-petition debt.
Background
As recently reported in our Fall 2007 issue, Judge Lifland’s decision in In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,1 limited the ability of offshore funds in financial distress to utilize chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Introduction
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”) requires an employer to give 60 days’ advance written notice prior to a plant closing or mass layoff. Frequently, as a company encounters financial distress—a situation that often leads to a plant closing or mass layoff— creditors exercise greater control over the entity in an attempt to recover debts owed to them. When the faltering company fails to provide the requisite WARN notice, terminated employees often assert that WARN liability should attach to such creditors. In Coppola v. Bear, Stearns & Co.
With US Circuit Courts split on the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to release third parties from creditors’ claims without the creditors’ consent, a move known as non-consensual third-party release, the Seventh Circuit recently weighed in the affirmative in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc.1 With the split widening between the circuits on this matter, it seems more likely than ever that the Supreme Court could weigh in on and decide this critical issue to lenders and others.2
One of the hallmarks of chapter 11, and bankruptcy jurisprudence in general in the U.S., is the fundamental right of creditors and other stakeholders to have a meaningful voice in the proceedings concerning matters that affect their economic interests.