In the last issue of Franchise Alert, we discussed how to spot signs of franchisee financial distress at an early stage. Here, we present some steps franchisors can take to deal with financially distressed franchisees.

Update Files

Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.

In Geygan v. World Savings Bank, FSB, 2008 FED App. 0005P (6th Cir. B.A.P. Mar. 12, 2008), the Sixth Circuit BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court, holding that the mortgage’s certificate of acknowledgment, which included the phrase “witness my hand” next to the notary’s signature, did not comply with Ohio law, and that the Trustee was a bona fide purchaser pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 

The question, “Can we get them to agree not to file bankruptcy in the future?” must be near the top of the list of questions clients most commonly ask their transactions and workout lawyers.

Most lawyers fielding this question are likely to explain that such an agreement is not enforceable under bankruptcy law. Good lawyers then suggest that in certain situations, an agreement for the entry of an order lifting the automatic bankruptcy stay, or an agreement not to oppose a lift-stay motion if the other side files a bankruptcy petition, may be enforceable.

Adjustable rate mortgages began to reset just as the economic outlook for subprime borrowers soured. Defaults on subprime debt inevitably followed. The onslaught of litigation against all players in the subprime lending arena followed just as inevitably.

I. INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcies and restructurings involving partners and partnerships1 raise a number of unique tax issues. While the IRS has provided guidance with respect to a number of these issues, a surprising number of unresolved issues remain. The first part of this outline summarizes the state of the law with respect to general tax issues that typically arise in connection with partner and partnership bankruptcies and restructurings. The balance of the outline discusses tax issues that arise under Subchapter K when troubled partnerships are reorganized.

If you thought, like many, that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billet, 2007 Del. LEXIS 357 (Del. 2007), put the theory of “deepening insolvency” to rest, once and for all, well, think again. A recent decision, George L. Miller v. McCown De Leeuw & Co. (In re The Brown Schools), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1226 (Bankr. D. Del. April 24, 2008), from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware shows that “deepening insolvency” endures, albeit in reduced form.

In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Oneida Ltd.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a premium payment created by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”)2 for pension plans terminated as part of a chapter 11 restructuring is a pre-petition claim or a post-petition administrative expense. The Court held that the statutorily mandated premium payment was a contingent pre-petition claim and was discharged upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.