The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.

In Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York refused to allow the foreign representatives of two Bear Stearns funds2 to institute ancillary proceedings under new chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. There, Judge Lifland held that, even though the Funds were in liquidation proceedings in the Cayman Islands, those proceedings constituted neither “foreign main” nor “foreign non-main” proceedings for purposes of the U.S.

The failed bid of liquidators for two hedge funds affiliated with defunct investment firm Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., to obtain recognition of the funds’ Cayman Islands winding-up proceedings under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was featured prominently in business headlines during the late summer and fall of 2007.

The Exempted Limited Partnership (Amendment) Law, 2009, which was enacted in March 2009 and is expected to come into effect before the end of April 2009, has made significant changes to the regime for the winding up and dissolution of exempted limited partnerships (“Partnerships”). The opportunity has also been taken to clarify certain other provisions of the Exempted Limited Partnership Law (2007 Revision) (“ELP Law”).  

Winding Up and Dissolution  

Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, Unreported judgment given 9 September 2009.

As a matter of English and Cayman law, does the court have jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, at the behest of a judgement creditor, by way of equitable execution over a settlor’s power of revocation of a trust?

Facts

In recent years, with the large increase in the number of enterprise bankruptcy cases, the instances of the legal representative or directors, supervisors and/or senior executives of a bankrupt enterprise (collectively, “senior officers”) being sued by the administrator or creditors have become common. In light of such laws as the Company Law, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, etc., and typical cases in judicial practice, such senior officers chiefly face the following risks:

This article was first published in the Global Restructuring Review, 14 Jan 2020.

Chinese bankruptcies have surged recently as the government uses the legal system to deal with “zombie” companies and reduce industrial overcapacity as part of a broader effort to restructure the economy. According to figures from the Supreme People’s Court, Chinese courts accepted 5,665 bankruptcy cases in 2016, an increase of 53.8% from the previous year1. As the Chinese government and the courts become more receptive to bankruptcies, without a mature market-based credit system in place, the risks heighten that debtors and creditors could try to game the bankruptcy process.

破产重整，实践中也称之为司法重组、法庭内重组、破产保护，是在人民法院主导下进行的企业重组活动，是《企业破产法》规定的三种程序之一。与破产清算程序不同，破产重整程序旨在帮助限于困境的企业脱离困境、实现重生。自《企业破产法》于2007年6月1日实施以来，沪深两市已有49家上市公司实施了破产重整，其中47家已完成重整。此外，部分从沪深两家交易所退市的公司也实施了破产重整。从实践来看，破产重整的上市公司或者退市公司多数具有债务负担沉重、持续经营能力较弱、盈利能力较差的特点。从结果来看，破产重整程序确实起到了拯救困难企业的积极作用。长航凤凰（SZ，000520）、长航油运5（400061）是近年来通过破产重整程序实现企业脱困复兴的典型案例。

The People’s Republic of China (“PRC“) recently launched two initiatives in relation to enterprise bankruptcies. These initiatives will provide significant benefits to both applicants and creditors when they seek to exercise their respective rights during the enterprise bankruptcy process.