Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Chapter 11 filing earlier this year has highlighted an issue that is well settled but sometimes overlooked: Unsecured creditors generally have no right to receive immediate payment of their legal fees from a bankrupt borrower, regardless of any contractual rights they might otherwise have absent the bankruptcy.

Bank structural reform: too big to fail, too big to save and too complex to manage, supervise and resolve? 1.1 The case for bank structural reform Bank structural reform is the result of a global financial crisis which developed in the summer of 2007 and became obvious in the EU in the latter part of 2008. The EU Member States that share an economic and monetary union (‘the Eurozone’) began to appear particularly vulnerable: the Greek sovereign debt crisis became apparent in early 2010 and serious economic problems emerged in Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain.

The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) estimates that by the end of 2010, more than 300 banks will have failed, and that the cost of resolving these failures may reach $100 billion over the next four years.1

Although the Supreme Court identified three guideposts for evaluating whether a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive 23 years ago in BMW v. Gore and refined those guideposts 16 years ago in State Farm v.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a creditor’s claim is a “secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property”—that is, it is a secured claim for an amount equal to the present value of the collateral—and is an “unsecured claim” for the remainder. Section 506(d) provides that, “[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.”

The active trading of loans made to a borrower that has become unable to repay in full (known as non-performing loans or distressed debt) has been a feature of the North American and European loan markets for a number of years.

When executing public M&A transactions, dealmakers need to understand local market practice as well as the local regulatory environment.

By an ordinance (Mandatsbescheid) issued on March 1, 2015, the Austrian Financial Market Authority (“FMA”) has initiated the resolution of HETA ASSET RESOLUTION AG (“HETA”). HETA is the “bad bank” that was established to assume and manage large parts of the Austrian Bank Hypo-Alpe-Adria, which was required to be resolved in accordance with EU regulations. HETA is 100 percent owned by the Republic of Austria, and it currently manages assets worth approximately EUR 18 billion.

In its recent consultation (“Managing the failure of systematic Digital Settlement Asset (including stablecoin) firms”), the Government has proposed that one of two special administration regimes (SARs) which currently apply to certain financial institutions (the Financial Market Infrastructure Special Administration Regime (FMI SAR) or the Payment and E-Money Special Administ

Introduction

For more than a century, a creditor holding English law governed debt relied on the principle (known as the “rule in Gibbs ”) that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged by a foreign insolvency proceeding, provided that the creditor does not submit to that proceeding.