Prepayment premiums (also referred to as make-whole premiums) are a common feature in loan documents, allowing lenders to recover a lump-sum amount if a borrower pays off loan obligations prior to maturity, effectively compensating lenders for yield that they would have otherwise received absent prepayment. As a result of the widespread use of such provisions, three circuit courts of appeal – the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second, Third and Fifth Circuit – have recently had to address the enforceability of prepayment provisions in bankruptcy.

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649

A Chapter 11 bankruptcy is implemented through a plan that assigns allowed claims to classes of different priority levels. Unsecured claimants without priority are not entitled to any payment on their claims until all priority claims have been satisfied.

Crises of credit and financial institutions are currently the order of the day.

The first half of 2019 continues a long growth rally for the fund finance market, with fund finance deal volume at Mayer Brown significantly up from last year. This growth occurred despite a three-year decline in the number of final fund closings.1 This apparent contradiction can be explained both by the penetration of traditional subscription credit facilities into a broader range of fund types and the diversification of fund finance product offerings in the market (including a notable uptick in the number of hybrid facility and net asset value credit facility closings).

On February 17, 2016, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) (collectively, the “agencies”) jointly proposed a rule to supplement the statutory provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” or “OLA”) that govern the orderly liquidation of a “covered broker or dealer”—i.e., an SEC-registered broker or dealer that is a member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and for which a systemic risk determination to trigger the application of the OLA has been made.

In the current economic climate, security for payment is key. Although banks have started to lend money again, they remain cautious and those construction firms with weak balance sheets remain at risk of insolvency. This article discusses five pitfalls in the context of some relevant case-law and devices to protect against these.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Chapter 11 filing earlier this year has highlighted an issue that is well settled but sometimes overlooked: Unsecured creditors generally have no right to receive immediate payment of their legal fees from a bankrupt borrower, regardless of any contractual rights they might otherwise have absent the bankruptcy.

Bank structural reform: too big to fail, too big to save and too complex to manage, supervise and resolve? 1.1 The case for bank structural reform Bank structural reform is the result of a global financial crisis which developed in the summer of 2007 and became obvious in the EU in the latter part of 2008. The EU Member States that share an economic and monetary union (‘the Eurozone’) began to appear particularly vulnerable: the Greek sovereign debt crisis became apparent in early 2010 and serious economic problems emerged in Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain.

The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) estimates that by the end of 2010, more than 300 banks will have failed, and that the cost of resolving these failures may reach $100 billion over the next four years.1

Although the Supreme Court identified three guideposts for evaluating whether a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive 23 years ago in BMW v. Gore and refined those guideposts 16 years ago in State Farm v.