Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

During summer 2023 the Swedish Government Official Report (SOU 2023:34) (the “Report”) was published proposing, inter alia, the removal of the requirements of a limited liability company to prepare a control balance sheet (Sw. Kontrollbalansräkning) and eventually enter into liquidation upon shortage of own capital. Instead, the suggestion was that the emphasis should be shifted more towards liquidity and solvency. The Report has now been through a referral process and by 15 December 2023 various referral bodies had submitted their responses to the Report.

HM Treasury has published a response to its consultation on managing the failure of systemic digital settlement asset firms.

The U.K. Jurisdiction Taskforce has published a consultation relating to its proposed Legal Statement offering guidance on the application of English insolvency law principles to digital assets. The proposed Legal Statement will cover a range of areas which are listed in an Annex to the paper.

A "Liquidation Preference" is a clause in investment and shareholders’ agreements that determines the order in which proceeds from a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or asset sale) are distributed among different shareholders. This clause often pertains primarily to preferred shareholders, such as venture capital investors.

The U.K. Financial Services and Markets Act 2023

The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) had to decide in which case a social compensation plan endowment by the conciliation committee is economically unjustifiable for a company outside of insolvency. This shall be the case if the fulfilment of the social compensation plan obligation would lead to illiquidity, balance sheet over-indebtedness or an unacceptable reduction of the company's equity. If the endowment was economically unjustifiable, the discretion of the conciliation committee was exceeded and the social compensation plan therefore invalid.

Das Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) hatte darüber zu entscheiden, wann eine Sozialplandotierung durch die Einigungsstelle für ein Unternehmen außerhalb der Insolvenz wirtschaftlich unvertretbar ist. Dies sei der Fall, wenn die Erfüllung der Sozialplanverbindlichkeit zu einer Illiquidität, einer bilanziellen Überschuldung oder einer nicht mehr hinnehmbaren Schmälerung des Eigenkapitals der Gesellschaft führe. Liege danach eine wirtschaftliche Unvertretbarkeit vor, sei das Ermessen der Einigungsstelle überschritten und der beschlossene Sozialplan unwirksam.

Overview

Introduction

Non-consensual third-party releases are provisions in reorganization plans that release non-debtor parties from liability to other non-debtor parties without the consent of all potential claimholders. These releases are frequently included in chapter 11 plans of reorganization. Most circuit courts allow these releases under certain circumstances; however, there is a split among circuit courts as to whether such non-consensual third-party releases are permitted by the Bankruptcy Code.