In its judgment of 11 October 2011, the English Court of Appeal analysed the terms of an aircraft purchase agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by Gesner and the aircraft manufacturer Bombardier.  The Agreement was in Bombardier’s standard terms.  Gesner, the purchaser, sought to terminate the agreement on the grounds that Bombardier had delayed in fulfilling its contractual obligations.  Thereafter, Bombardier sought to retain certain monies as liquidated damages upon termination of the Agreement.  Gesner challenged this retention.

Application for an administration order in respect of FM Front Door Ltd. The application followed FM’s failure to make payments under a loan from the Dunfermline Building Society obtained to assist with the purchase of flats at the Skyline development on Finniestoun Street in Glasgow.  The loan was secured by a floating charge and standard securities over each of the flats. FM’s parent company FM Developments also granted a guarantee for the loan.

Clause 13 of the loan agreement provided that the grounds for default included:

The House Judiciary Committee recently held a hearing to consider an amendment to the venue provisions of the Bankruptcy Code proposed by the Committee’s Chairman that would require corporations to file voluntary chapter 11 petitions in the district where they maintain their principal place of business or have their principal assets. Under the current bankruptcy venue provisions of the U.S. Code, a debtor corporation can file its bankruptcy case in the state where it is incorporated, where it has its principal assets, or where it is headquartered.

In In re Washington Mutual, Inc., No. 08-12229 (MFW), 2011 WL 4090757 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept.

In a recent ruling, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a per se rule that only corporate insiders can have their debt claims recharacterized as equity. Instead, in In re Lothian Oil Inc., 2011 WL 3473354 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2011), the Court of Appeals held that "recharacterization extends beyond insiders and is part of the bankruptcy courts' authority to allow and disallow claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502." Thus, all creditors, regardless of their insider status, are susceptible to having their claims recharacterized as equity.

The Facts of the Case

In RGH Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2011 WL 2471542 (N.Y.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled in Stern v. Marshall[1] that the congressional grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on counterclaims to proofs of claim was unconstitutional. For the litigants, this decision brought an end to an expensive and drawn out litigation between the estates of former Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband, Pierce Marshall, which Justice Roberts writing for the majority analogized to the fictional litigation in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House.

In In re Young Broadcasting, Inc., et al., 430 B.R. 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), a bankruptcy court strictly construed the change-in-control provisions of a pre-petition credit agreement and refused to confirm an unsecured creditors' committee's plan of reorganization, which had been premised on the reinstatement of the debtors' accelerated secured debt under Section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On February 11, 2011, the Hon Alan Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a 113 page opinion and order quashing the bankruptcy court's order requiring the lenders involved in TOUSA, Inc.'s Transeastern joint venture to disgorge, as fraudulent transfers under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, settlement monies that they had received on July 31, 2007 in repayment of their existing debt and to pay prejudgment interest on such monies, for a total disgorgement in excess of $480 million.

1 Loranger v Jones, 184 Cal App 4th 847 (3d Dist May 2010)

Jones, a licensed contractor, had a workers' compensation policy covering his employees. Jones unknowingly used an unlicensed subcontractor and knowingly permitted two minors without work permits, and another person without a contractor's license, to help perform work for Loranger. Loranger refused to pay the final invoice and Jones filed suit for breach of contract. Loranger cross-complained alleging defects and sought disgorgement of monies paid.