The general rule is that claims of the bankruptcy estate against third parties (e.g., preference claims and tort claims) can be sold to third parties in a § 363 sale.[Fn. 1]

However, a recent opinion from the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discusses whether a state’s champerty law impairs a § 363 sale.[Fn. 2] 

The Fifth Circuit recently ruled that a debtor can sell a preferential transfer action under Bankruptcy Code section 363 to a purchaser that is not a representative of the bankruptcy estate. Briar Cap. Working Fund Cap., L.L.C. v. Remmert (In re S. Coast Supply Co.), No. 22-20536, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1417 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024).

Bankruptcy and appellate courts disagree over the standard that should apply to a request for payment of a break-up fee or expense reimbursement to the losing bidder in a sale of assets outside the ordinary course of the debtor's business. Some apply a "business judgment" standard, while others require that the proposed payments satisfy the more rigorous standard applied to administrative expense claims.

“Subchapter V relieves small business debtors from the absolute priority rule.”[Fn. 1]

• This was the excuse for a contorted grammatical interpretation, against the debtor, of a Subchapter V statute by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gives the same excuse for the same contorted grammatical interpretation — like this:

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code offers powerful protection for good-faith purchasers in bankruptcy sales because it limits appellate review of an approved sale, irrespective of the legal merits of the appeal. Specifically, it provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving the sale of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order. That is, section 363(m) renders an appeal "statutorily moot" absent a stay of the sale order.

To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.

On April 17, 2023, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion holding that a senior lender who uses economic leverage and exercises its statutory and contractual rights upon a borrower’s default, including the right to credit bid as part of a bankruptcy sale process—despite adverse impact on a junior lender—remains a “good faith” purchaser entitled to the protections under Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC, ruled Bankruptcy Code section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, i.e. just a “mere restriction on the effects of a valid exercise” of judicial power “when a party successfully appeals a covered authorization.” Before MOAC, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held section 363(m) to be non-jurisdictional, but the Fifth and Second Circuits had diverged.

Reasoning

In a recent per curium opinion, the Fifth Circuit recommitted to its practice of dismissing claims against court-appointed fiduciaries when plaintiffs fail to obtain permission before bringing suit. The court rested its decision on the Barton doctrine, which other courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have found inapplicable in similar circumstances.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. Bankruptcy courts generally apply a deferential "business judgment" standard to the decision of a trustee or DIP to assume or reject an executory contract or an unexpired lease.