The House Judiciary Committee recently heard testimony on the benefits and pitfalls of proposed legislation that would change bankruptcy venue rules by imposing limitations on where corporations may file for bankruptcy protection. The hearing came in the wake of a statement by Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith, R-Texas, in which he asked how Enron had been able to file its bankruptcy case in Manhattan considering that Enron was based in, and had substantially all of its assets and operations in, Texas.

• On September 16, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice amended its complaint to enjoin the AT&T/T-Mobile merger to include the states of New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Washington, and Ohio as additional plaintiffs. United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 11-cv-1560 (D.D.C.).
• On September 19, 2011, the United Stated District Court for the Northern District of Texas largely denied the motion to dismiss of Verizon Communications, and related entities, against claims that they defrauded investors and creditors via spinoff company Idearc.

On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit held that Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("Trustee"), utilized the correct methodology to determine the "net equity" of each Madoff investor under the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA").

Employers are constrained by dozens of rules and regulations limiting their hiring criteria. In today’s economy, one question that often arises is whether employers may refuse to hire bankrupt job applicants. Surprisingly, the answer for private employers may be yes.

On June 28, 2011, the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) shields from avoidance in bankruptcy cases an issuer's payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de CV, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. ALFA, S.A.B. de C.V., Nos. 09-5122-bk(L), 09-5142-bk (Con), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13177 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011). The decision marks the first time an appeals court has considered whether redemption payments constitute "settlement payments" under section 546(e).

The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).  

The second priority lien held by a junior lien holder is a property interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.In re Three Strokes L.P., 379 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008). Inasmuch as a senior lien holder’s foreclosure proceedings would have the effect of extinguishing the debtor’s second lien interest, a court may only lift the stay and permit the foreclosure to proceed upon such senior lien holder’s showing of adequate protection.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that an investor in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC") lacked standing to object to the sale of a chapter 11 debtor's real property, despite that the property served as collateral for loans held in trust by the REMIC for the benefit of its investors.